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NOTES
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IN MINNESOTA
Viewing as punitive in nature the award of interest from the date of the injuiy on
damages that are uncertain in amount, Minnesota courts have refused to grant
prjudgment interest on unliquidated damages. This Note reviews the current trend
in the United States toward awarding prejudgment interest and calls on the Min-
nesota legislature to provide for prejudgment interest. Until the legislature acts,
Minnesota courts should dispense with the liquidated/unliquidated distinction and
award prejudgment interest from the date of the ihjuiy by using a multi-factor
analysis. Thus Minnesota would adequately compensate injured parties and avoid
the unjust ennchment that flows from delaying dispute resolution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, Anglo-American courts have been unwilling to award in-
terest., This hesitancy stems from the medieval view that interest is evil2
and courts' reluctance to appropriate an area of law traditionally re-
1. See Laycock v. Parker, 103 Wis. 161, 178-89, 79 N.W. 327, 332-36 (1899); D.
DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.5 (1973); C. MCCORMICK, HAND-
BOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES §§ 51-59 (1935); H. MCGREGOR, MCGREGOR ON DAM-
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served for state legislatures.3
Although interest is awarded more frequently now than in the past,
state legislatures and courts rarely award interest other than for conven-
tional interest.4 Conventional interest is interest at a rate agreed upon
by the transacting parties. 5 It is distinguished from the legal interest
rate, the rate prescribed by law absent an express explicit agreement.
6
Most states have adopted the conventional interest rule7 as an exception
embodied within the state statute delineating the legal interest rate.8
State legislatures and courts are particularly slow in recognizing a jus-
ticiable claim for interest when interest is asserted as a part of damages. 9
The rationale for allowing interest as a part of damages is to compensate
AGES §§ 433-50 (13th ed. 1972); T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF
DAMAGES 391-408 (1852).
2. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, §§ 51, at 55; T. SEDGWICK,Supra note 1, at 391-
408; see also Comment Prejidgmenl Interest: An Element of Damages Not To Be Overlooked, 8
Cum. L Rev. 521 (1977).
3. See Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 356, 307 A.2d 571, 573-74, appeal dismissed, 414
U.S. 1106 (1973); 10 SETON HALL L. REV. 200 (1979).
4. See D. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 3.5, at 164.
5. See 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 179 (1965); Comment, supra note 2, at 521.
6. See infra notes 7-8.
7. The conventional interest rule allows parties to contract among themselves for a
rate of interest different from the legal rate of interest. Most states have adopted usury
laws limiting the maximum rate of interest that parties may agree to pay. See 45 AM. JUR.
2D Interest and Usury §§ 4-13 (1969); D. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 3.5 at 170. Minnesota fol-
lows the conventional interest rule. See MINN. STAT. § 334.01 (1982); see infla note 8.
8. See MINN. STAT. § 334.01 (1982):
Rate of Interest.
Subdivision 1. The interest for any legal indebtedness shall be at the rate of
$6 upon $100 for a year, unless a different rate is contracted for in writing; and
no person shall directly or indirectly take or receive in money, goods, or things in
action, or in any other way, any greater sum, or any greater value, for the loan or
forbearance of money, goods, or things in action, than $8 on $100 for one year;
and, in the computation of interest upon any bond, note, or other instrument or
agreement, interest shall not be compounded, but any contract to pay interest,
not usurious, upon interest overdue, shall not be construed to be usury. Contract
shall bear the same rate of interest after they become due as before, and any
provision in any contract, note, or instrument providing for an increase of the
rate of interest after maturity, or any increase therein after making and delivery,
shall work a forfeiture of the entire interest; but this provision shall not apply to
notes or contracts which bear no interest before maturity nor shall it apply to
any agreement which extends the maturity date of any contract, note, or instru-
ment, and provides for an increased rate of interest after the original maturity
date on the indebtedness then due, provided that any agreement which extends
maturity date of any contract, note or instrument shall not provide for an in-
creased rate of interest in excess of $8 on $100 for one year.
Subd. 2. A contract for the loan or forbearance of money, goods, or things
in action, in the amount of $100,000 or more, and any extensions, including
extensions of installments and related chang6s in the terms thereof, shall be ex-
empt from the provisions of this chapter and the interest for the indebtedness
shall be at the rate of $6 upon $100 for a year, unless a different rate is con-
tracted for in writing.
9. Interest awarded as a part of damages is also called "moratory" interest. See
19831
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the injured party and to punish the wrongful detainer of the plaintiff's
money.I 0 The rules allowing interest awards as part of damages are es-
tablished by statute' I or by traditional common-law rules.12 Interest as a
part of damages is not part of the underlying cause of action, but is
awarded for the detention of money found to be due.
13
Conventional interest and interest as a part of damages are forms of
prejudgment interest.14 Prejudgment interest denotes interest on a judg-
ment computed from the time of actual injury or breach of the contract
to the date of final judgment. 15 Prejudgment interest is distinguishable
from post-judgment interest and interest on the verdict. 16 Post-judgment
interest is the common-law rule allowing interest in all claims once the
sum is made certain in the form of a judgment. 17 Interest on the verdict
statutes allow interest to be computed on the final judgment from the
Parker v. Brinson Constr. Co., 78 So. 2d 873, 874 (Fla. 1955); Farnworth v. Jensen, 117
Utah 494, 501, 217 P.2d 571, 575 (1950).
For a general discussion on courts' reluctance to award interest as a part of damages,
see Hare & Meelheim, Prejudgment Interest in Personal Injury Litigation.- A Policy of Fairness, 5
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 81, 84 (1981). See also 1 S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL
DEATH § 8.6 (2d ed. 1975) (general discussion on history of prejudgment interest in tort
actions). See generally Note, Prejudgment Interest.- Surve and Suggestion, 77 Nw. U. L. REV.
192 (1982); Note, The Availabih'y of Prejudgment Interest in Personal Injury and Wrongful Death
Cases, 16 U.S.F.L. REV. 325 (1982).
10. See 22 AM. JR. 2D Damages §§ 179, 183 nn.6-7 (1965).
11. See, e.g., Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 357, 307 A.2d 571, 576,appeal dismissed, 414
U.S. 1106 (1973) (court noted interest as part of damages allowed by statute in some
states); Hare & Meelheim, supra note 9, at 92.
12. See, e.g., Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 221 Kan. 448, 468-69, 562 P.2d 1, 16, cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 867 (1977); Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 357, 307 A.2d 571, 576 (1973),
appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1106 (the controlling rules have always been and remain judge
made in New Jersey); Bond v. City of Huntington, 276 S.E.2d 539, 549 (W. Va. 1981)
(interest after the verdict is ordinarily set by statute, whereas interest as compensatory
damages is set by the courts).
13. See Comment, supra note 2, at 527-28, 533; Comment, Allowance of "Interest" on
Unliquidated Tort Damages in Pennsylvania, 75 DICK. L. REv. 79, 83 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Comment, Allowance of Interest]; see also 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 179 at 256-57 (1965);
Annot., 96 A.L.R.2D 1104, 1106 n.l (1964).
14. See Comment, supra note 2, at 527-28, 533; Comment, Allowance of Interest, supra
note 13, at 83; see also 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 179 at 256-57 (1965); Annot., 96
A.L.R.2D 1104, 1106 n.1 (1964).
15. D. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 3.5, at 164 (1973) (definition of prejudgment interest).
See H. OLECK, DAMAGES TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY § 63 (rev. ed. 1961) (damages un-
certain in amount need be established by agreement, or by jury, or court, are unliquidated
damages).
16. See D. DOBBS, supra note 15.
17. Id. The common-law post-judgment interest rule has been codified by the follow-
ing six states: CAL. CIV. CODE § 3287 (West 1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 55.03 (West 1982);
IOWA CODE § 535.2(l)(b) (1979); LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 2924 (West 1982); MICH.
COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.6455 (1968) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.6455 (Callaghan 1974));
NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-103 (1978); and NEV. REV. STAT. § 17.130(2) (1981).
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date of the verdict.18 A minority of states have enacted interest on the
verdict statutes' 9 or prejudgment interest statutes.20 Minnesota has
adopted an interest on the verdict statute.
2'
This Note examines the theories upon which prejudgment interest is
awarded or denied in both contract and tort litigation. Part two ana-
lyzes the historical development and current status of Minnesota law
governing prejudgment interest.22 Part three examines recent develop-
18. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 549.09 (1982) (interest from the date of the verdict stat-
ute); W. VA. CODE § 56-5-9 (1981) (interest from the date of the verdict statute). For the
current construction of the statute on verdicts and judgments see MINN. STAT. § 549.09
(1982):
Interest on Verdicts and Judgments.
Subdivision 1. When the judgment is for the recovery of money, including a
judgment for the recovery of taxes, interest from the time of the verdict or report
until judgment is finally entered shall be computed by the clerk as provided in
this section and added to the judgment. The interest shall be computed as sim-
ple interest per annum. The rate of interest shall be based on the secondary
market yield of one year United States treasury bills, calculated on a bank dis-
count basis as provided in this section.
On or before the 20th day of December of each year the state court adminis-
trator shall determine the rate from the secondary market yield on one year
United States treasury bills for the most recent calendar month, reported on a
monthly basis in the latest statistical release of the board of governors of the
federal reserve system. This yield, rounded to the nearest one percent, shall be
the annual interest rate during the succeeding calendar year; provided, however,
that in no event shall the rate of interest be less than eight percent per annum.
The state court administrator shall communicate the interest rate to the clerks of
court for their use in computing the interest on verdicts.
Subd. 2. During each calendar year, interest shall accrue on the unpaid
balance of the judgment from the time that it is entered until it is paid, at the
annual rate provided in subdivision 1.
Interest on the verdict statutes are more like post-judgment interest rules than prejudg-
ment interest rules. The interest on the verdict statutes apply the post-judgment interest
principles of certainty and ascertainability. The interest on the verdict statutes, however,
permit interest to be computed sooner than post-judgment interest statutes but not as soon
as the prejudgment interest statutes. See generally authorities cited supra note 15. In the
recent West Virginia case of Bond v. City of Huntington, 276 S.E.2d 539, 549 (W. Va.
1981), the court notes that the date of the verdict statute in West Virginia is a "liberal"
interest statute. This comment is questionable when the interest on the verdict statutes
are compared with the prejudgment interest statutes, because prejudgment interest stat-
utes compute interest from the date of the injury or breach rather than from the date of
the verdict. Thus, prejudgment interest statutes give plaintiffs more complete compensa-
tion. Compare N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 5001(a-b) (McKinney 1963) with W. VA. CODE
§ 56-6-9 (1981).
19. See supra note 18.
20. For statutes on awarding interest from the date suit was commenced or complaint
filed, see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4203 (West 1968); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 524.1-b
(1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 727(2) (West Supp. 1982); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-21-10
(Supp. 1982); and W. VA. CODE § 56-6-31 (West Supp. 1982) (special or liquidated dam-
ages shall bear interest from the date the right to bring suit accrues; special damages
include lost wages and income, medical expenses, damages to tangible personal property,
and similar out of pocket expenditures, as determined by the court).
21. See supra note 18.
22. See infra notes 52-125 and accompanying text.
1983]
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ments of prejudgment interest in other jurisdictions. 23 Part four proposes
a "multi-factor analysis" to aid practicing attorneys and judges in con-
struing the conflicting and confusing prejudgment interest cases in Min-
nesota and other jurisdictions.24
II. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IN MINNESOTA
A. General Overview
Whether a court will award prejudgment interest depends upon three
factors. The first factor is the applicable statute, if any, controlling the
award of interest. The second factor is the nature of the plaintiffs under-
lying claim. The third factor is the theory the court adopts in resolving
the dispute.
In Minnesota, there is no statute that controls the award of prejudg-
ment interest. Minnesota law, however, adopted an interest on the ver-
dict statute.25 Minnesota Statutes section 549.09 allows interest to be
computed on the final judgment from the date of the verdict 26 but does
not preclude the award of interest prior to the verdict as a form of dam-
ages or compensation to the injured party.
27
In Minnesota, the plaintiffs underlying claim is classified as either liq-
uidated or unliquidated. 28 In contrast, the traditional approach was a
contract-tort distinction. The court determined whether the cause of ac-
tion sounded in contract or tort29 and interest was never awarded if the
action sounded in tort, but might be awarded if the action was a contract
23. See infra notes 126-223 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 224-262 and accompanying text.
25. See supra note 18.
26. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
27. The interest on the verdict statute was first enacted when Minnesota was a terri-
tory. See MINN. REV. TERR. STAT. ch. 72, § 8 (1856). In 1909, the language "judgment
for the recovery of taxes" was included. See Act of April 22, 1909, ch. 371, § 1, 1909 Minn.
Laws 425. The statute remained unchanged until 1980, when the Minnesota legislature
enacted a detailed formula for determining the rate of interest applicable on verdicts and
judgments. See supra note 18.
From the earliest cases, the Minnesota courts have not interpreted the interest on the
verdict statute as applicable to interest being awarded as a form of damages or compensa-
tion. See Swanson v. Andrus, 83 Minn. 505, 510, 86 N.W. 465, 467 (1901) (stating the
general rules on awarding interest and no mention of the interest on the verdict statute);
see also Moosbrugger v. McGraw-Edison Co., 284 Minn. 143, 170 N.W.2d 72 (1969) (court
held that amount of liability is not liquidated and MINN. STAT. § 549.09 is applicable).
For recent cases on the interest on the verdict statute see Unique Sys., Inc. v. Zotos
Intern., Inc., 622 F.2d 373 (8th Cir. 1980); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc.,
258 N.W.2d 762 (Minn. 1977); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 281 Minn. 571, 572-73, 161
N.W.2d 523, 523 (1968).
28. See Moosbrugger v. McGraw-Edison Co., 284 Minn. 143, 160, 170 N.W.2d 72, 82
(1969); Lacey v. Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range Ry., 236 Minn. 104, 107, 51 N.W.2d 831,
834 (1952); Swanson v. Andrus, 83 Minn. 505, 510, 86 N.W. 465, 467 (1901).
29. See in7fa notes 238-43 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 9
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claim.3 0 The Minnesota courts have always utilized the liquidated-un-
liquidated approach, rather than follow the traditional approach. 3 '
The general common-law rule distinguishing liquidated from unliqui-
dated damages provides that where the plaintiff's damages are fixed, cer-
tain, or readily ascertainable by computation or a generally recognized
standard, such as a market value, the damages are liquidated.3 2 Where
the damages are uncertain until the final judgment is rendered, the dam-
ages are unliquidated. 33 A companion common-law rule is that a dis-
pute between plaintiff and defendant about the amount of damages will
not make an otherwise liquidated amount unliquidated for purposes of
denying prejudgment interest.3
4
If the plaintiff's claim is liquidated, the court may or may not, depend-
ing upon the jurisdiction, allow prejudgment interest. In some jurisdic-
tions, the award of prejudgement interest on a liquidated claim is a
matter of right.3 5 On other jurisdictions, it is a matter of discretion for
the court or jury.36 The treatment of claims for prejudgment interest in
Minnesota with respect to liquidated damages is uncertain.3 7 This un-
certainty arises from the cursory treatment given prejudgement interest
in recent Minnesota opinions.
38
30. See Hare & Meelheim, supra note 9, at 82-84; Comment, supra note 2, at 530; see
also 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages §§ 183, 189 (1965) (general discussion of contract-tort dis-
tinction); cf. Lovell v. Marianna Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 267 Ark. 164, 168, 589 S.W.2d
577, 578-79 (1979) (courts disregards the contract-tort distinction).
31. See Lacey v. Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range Ry., 236 Minn. 104, 107, 51 N.W.2d
831, 834 (1952); Swanson v. Andrus, 83 Minn. 505, 510, 86 N.W. 465, 467 (1901) (general
rules on prejudgment interest established).
32. See Moosbrugger v. McGraw-Edison Co., 284 Minn. 143, 160, 170 N.W.2d 72, 82
(1969); Lacey v. Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range Ry., 236 Minn. 104, 107, 51 N.W.2d 831,
834 (1952); Swanson v. Andrus, 83 Minn. 505, 510, 86 N.W. 465, 467 (1901). See also
Comment, supra note 2, at 522 (delineates general rules on liquidated-unliquidated dam-
ages); 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 180-81 (1965) (discussion of general rules on liquidated-
unliquidated damages).
33. See Comment, supra note 2, at 522.
34. See ICC Leasing Corp. v. Midwestern Mach. Co., 257 N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn.
1977) (bona fide dispute about amount of damages should not bar accrual of prejudgment
interest in all circumstances or a plaintiff's right to interest would depend merely upon the
reasonableness of the defendant); Lacey v. Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range Ry., 236 Minn.
104, 107-08, 51 N.W.2d 831, 834 (1952); D. DOBBS,supra note 1, § 3.5, at 168; C. MCCOR-
MICK, supra note 1, § 54, at 215.
35. See D. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 3.5, at 172; 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 180, at 258
(1965).
36. See D. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 3.5, at 173, for a discussion of restitution. See id. at
169; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 55, at 220-21.
37. See infia notes 230-35 and accompanying text.
38. See generally Comment,Judgments: Interest onJudgment-Lilmiation on Recovery of Pre-
judgment Interest, 56 MINN. L. REV. 739 (1972) (discusses the confusion in Minnesota with
cases on prejudgment interest). For a comparison of seemingly conflicting opinions, com-
pare Hueper v. Goodrich, 314 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Minn. 1982) (disallowing prejudgment
interest because amount of liability under policy was not "readily ascertainable") with
1983]
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There are primarily three theories that courts utilize to allow prejudg-
ment interest: the punitive theory, the compensation theory, and the res-
titution theory.
39
Under the punitive theory, prejudgment interest is awarded where the
defendant has unlawfully detained plaintiff's property or money,
40
wrongfully converted plaintiff's property,41 or unreasonably and vexa-
tiously delayed the just resolution of plaintiff's action.42 Unreasonable
delay may result from vexatiously postponing payment of damages due,
excessively prolonging the length of pretrial discovery, or refusing to set-
tle. 4 3 The punitive theory is the only theory of recovery based on defend-
ant's fault or wrongful acts.
44
The objective of the compensatory theory is to make the plaintiff
whole.45 The compensatory theory does not require a mistake or willful
detention of plaintiff's money or property as does the punitive theory.4
6
All that is required is plaintiff be deprived of the use of his property or
money. To fully compensate him, judgment includes interest from the
Nauman v. J's Restaurants Int'l, Inc., 316 N.W.2d 523, 524 (Minn. 1982) (citing Hueper by
analogy and granting prejudgment interest on recision of alleged franchise sale).
39. For a general discussion of the various theories used by the courts to award or
deny prejudgment interest see D. Doaas, supra note 1, § 3.5; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1,
at §§ 54-59; Hare & Meelheim, supra note 9; Comment, supra note 2; Comment, Allowance
of Interest, supra note 13; Comment, supra note 38.
40. Comment, supra note 38, at 740; see 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 180 (1965). For a
general discussion of the punitive theory of recovery, see Comment, supra note 2, at 530-31.
41. See Comment, supra note 38, at 740; Comment, supra note 2, at 530-31.
42. See 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 180 (1965). See also Home Ins. v. Olmstead, 355 So.
2d 310, 314 (Miss. 1978) (bad faith and delay); Commnt, Allowance of Interest,supra note
13, at 85-89 (delay and the punitive theory mentioned).
43. See, e.g., Friends For All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 87 F.R.D. 560,
568 (1980) (delay of settlement); In re Paris Aircrash, 69 F.R.D. 310, 322-23 (1975) (delay
of trial); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bishop, 329 So. 2d 670, 673 (Miss. 1976)
(insurance company's refusal to settle was arbitrary and not in good faith).
44. See generally Comment, Allowance of Interest, supra note 13, at 88.
45. For a general discussion of the compensatory theory of recovery, see 22 AM. JUR.
2D. Damages § 181 (1965); D. DOBBS, supra note 1, at § 3.5 (rationale of interest rules); C.
McCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 257; Comment, Allowance ofInterest, supra note 13; Com-
ment, supra note 38, at 740-46.
For a good discussion of the compensatory theory of recovery for prejudgment inter-
est in tort, contract, and property cases, see Tennessee Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Strick
Corp., 283 N.C. 423, 440-42, 196 S.E.2d 711, 722-23 (1973) (determining what Penn-
sylvania law is). Not all courts, however, have been quick to adopt the just compensation
theory for recovery of prejudgment interest. See Unique Sys., Inc. v. Zotos Int'l, Inc., 622
F.2d 373, 380 (8th Cir. 1980) (court adopted Minnesota liquidated-unliquidated rules and
did not address the just compensation theory that the plaintiff argued). But see ICC Leas-
ing Corp. v. Midwestern Mach. Co., 257 N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn. 1977) (court awards
prejudgment interest based on compensation theory).
46. See Essex House v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 978, 995 (S.D.
Ohio 1975); Lovell v. Marianna Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 264 Ark. 164, 166-68, 589 S.W.2d
577, 578 (1979); Parker v. Brison Constr. Co., 78 So. 2d 873, 874 (Fla. 1955); Comment,
supra note 2, at 528.
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date of detention.47 As long as the plaintiff is awarded a money judg-
ment as compensation to make the injured plaintiff whole, prejudgment
interest should be included to fully restore the plaintiff to his original
position.48
The restitution theory awards interest to the plaintiff from the date of
injury or breach, where defendant would otherwise be unjustly enriched
at the plaintiff's expense. 49 The restitution theory is a counterpart to the
47. See supra note 46. Notably, Minnesota has long recognized that prejudgment in-
terest on a condemnation award, from the time of possession until the time of payment, is
an element of just compensation. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. City of Minneapolis, .143
Minn. 392, 395, 173 N.W. 713, 715 (1919) (just compensation for "taking" of property);
Warren v. First Div. St. P. & Pac. R.R., 21 Minn. 424, 427 (1875) (just compensation for
"taking" of property).
The recent case of State v. Carney affirms the award of prejudgment interest in a con-
demnation proceeding. See State v. Carney, 309 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. 1981). In affirming
the award of prejudgment interest the Carney court relied on the constitutional principle of
no taking without just compensation. Id. at 776. There was an eight-year period between
the date of the condemnation and the date of judgment. The Camey court required inter-
est to be included in the verdict from the date of the taking as required by the Minnesota
Constitution. See id. at 776 (citing MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13). The standard used to
determine the rate of interest to be paid the landowner was "the market value of the
property at the time of taking contemporaneously paid in money." Id. The Carney court
included interest as if the landowner had made a reasonable and prudent investment.
The Came Court allowed interest to be computed at a rate in excess of the legal rate of
interest statute. See MINN. STAT. § 334.01(1) (1980). The just compensation approach
adopted by the Camey court to award prejudgment interest is unique to the property con-
demnation field. Therefore, the constitutional just compensation approach based on
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13 should be distinguished from the equitable just compensation
approach. For a discussion of the just compensation approach in equity, see Minneapolis
Harvestor Works v. Bonnallie, 29 Minn. 373, 375, 13 N.W. 149, 151 (1882). See also Com-
ment, supra note 38, at 742 n.21, 746 (equitable just compensation).
48. See supra note 45.
49. See D. DoBBS, supra note 1, at § 3.5 (a right of restitution); C. MCCORMICK, supra
note 1, at § 59; Comment, supra note 2, at 528 (unjust enrichment theory).
For a discussion of the interweaving of the compensation and restitution theories of
recovery of prejudgment interest, see Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 221 Kan. 448, 562 P.2d
1, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867 (1977), where the court summarizes:
The general rule followed by some authorities is that interest as dam-
ages cannot, in the absence of any statutory provision therefor, be re-
covered as a matter of right in an action of contract upon an
unliquidated claim. In a growing number ofjurisdictions, however, the
allowance of interest on such unliquidated claims is discretionary with
the court, and interest will be allowed where required to give full
compensation ...
[citations omitted]. This type of reasoning was employed to award prejudgment
interest on an unliquidated claim in Brookyn Union Gas Co. v. Transcontinental Gas
P.L Corp., 201 F. Supp. 679 (S.D. Tex. 1960),affld 299 F.2d (5th Cir. 1962)....
The court treated the matter as one of restitution, and found that interest should
be allowed under Restatement, Restitution, § 156. It also found that "the dis-
trict courts are vested with considerable discretion in the awarding of interest
damages upon restitutory sums. Considerations of fairness and traditional equi-
table principles are to guide the exercise of this discretion."
Id. at 468-69, 562 P.2d at 16. The Ltghicap opinion was adopted by a later Kansas case,
1983]
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compensatory theory of recovery. To fully compensate the plaintiff, the
defendant will often be precluded from being unjustly enriched or bene-
fiting from the defendant's use of plaintiffs money or property.5O The
restitution theory is applicable in situations where the punitive theory
would allow the defendant to forego paying interest because the defend-
ant's actions do not justify punishment.51
In examining the recent developments in Minnesota and other juris-
dictions, it is important to note which theory is used by the court award-
ing prejudgment interest.
B. Minnesota Cases on Prejudgment Interest
The first Minnesota case to summarize the common-law prejudgment
interest rules was Swanson v. Andrus.52 The Swanson court stated the gen-
eral rule:
Whatever is, or may have been, the rule in other jurisdictions as to
allowing [prejudgment] interest by way of damages, this court has so
allowed it as a matter of law, even in cases where the demand was
unliquidated, provided its pecuniary amount did not depend upon any
contingencies, and was ascertainable by computation, or by reference
to generally recognized standards, such as market value.
53
The Swanson court also summarized the common-law rule on the ex-
clusion of unliquidated damages as a part of prejudgment interests:
On the other hand, interest has not been allowed where the damages
claimed were not only unliquidated, but could not be ascertained by
reference to any generally recognized standard, or were, any part of
them, prospective or contingent, or the amount thereof depended in
whole or in part upon the discretion of the jury. Actions for personal
injuries, seduction, libel, slander, and false imprisonment fall within
this classification.
54
To summarize these prejudgment interest rules, the Swanson court
drew from various cases that analyzed the award of interest in the con-
see Schaefer &Assoc., PA. v. Schirmer, 3 Kan. App. 2d 114, 509 P.2d 1087 (1979) where the
court stated:
As a general rule, pre-judgment interest is not allowable on an unliquidated
claim; but that rule is qualified in that, where necessary to arrive at full compen-
sation, a court may in the exercise of its discretion award interest or its
equivalent as an element of damages, even where the primary claim is unliqui-
dated. Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 221 Kan. 448, 562 P.2d 1, cert. denied, 434
U.S. 867 (1977).
Id. at 118, 509 P.2d at 1092.
50. See D. DOBBS, supra note 1, at § 3.5 (a right of restitution); C. MCCORMICK, supra
note 1, at § 59.
51. See sura notes 44 & 46 and accompanying text.
52. 83 Minn. 505, 86 N.W. 465 (1901).
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text of conversion 55 or destruction of personal property.56 In Swanson,
the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the common-law rules on pre-
judgment interest developed in America, rather than the narrower rules
followed in England.
5 7
The Minnesota Supreme Court reaffirmed the liquidated-unliqui-
dated distinction in Lacey v. Duluth, Mzssabe & Iron Range Railway Co. 58
The Lacey court awarded interest from the date of demand because dam-
ages could be ascertained by a recognized standard. 59 The lack of liqui-
dated damages did not deter the court from awarding prejudgment
interest because the amount claimed by plaintiff could be determined
with reference to a reasonable standard of value for labor and equipment
55. See, e.g., Nesbitt v. St. Paul Lumber Co., 21 Minn. 491 (1875) (wrongful conver-
sion of timer); Derby v. Gallup, 5 Minn. 119 (Gil. 85) (1860) (conversion of personal prop-
erty).
The common-law rule on trover allowed interest to be computed on the value of the
goods at the time of conversion as the normal and usual measure of recovery. See F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 2.36 (1974). In accord with this common-law
rule of trover the court in Derby v. Gallup stated:
[Ilt would be gross injustice to allow the party who has been proved guilty of a
wrongful taking and conversion of property, to have the use of the same during,
perhaps, years of litigation, and then escape with paying the rightful owner the
bare value of the property at the time of the taking, if the jury should choose so
to find. Such a rule would amount to scarcely less than the offering of a pre-
mium for the commission of a wrong, since, under the law at present, he would
not even suffer the trifling inconvenience of paying his adversary's costs.
5 Minn. 119, 138 (Gil. 85, 103) (1860).
56. See Swanson v. Andrus, 83 Minn. 505, 510, 86 N.W. 465, 467 (1901). See, e.g.,
Varco v. Chicago, M & St. P. Ry., 30 Minn. 18, 13 N.W. 921 (1882) (defendant negligent
in duty to repair fence where plaintiff's chattel was destroyed by train).
57. See Swanson v. Andrus, 83 Minn. at 510, 86 N.W. at 467. See also Varco v. Chi-
cago, M. & St. P. Ry., 30 Minn. 18, 22, 13 N.W. 921, 922 (1882) (citing SEDGWICK ON
DAMAGES).
The rules on prejudgment interest in England have been relaxed in recent years to
conform more with the trend in America of awarding prejudgment interest in personal
injury and liquidated tort claims. See e.g. Interest on Damages, 114 SOLIC. J. 612 (1970);
Walker, Interest on Damages, 120 NEW L.J. 237, 308 (1970); see also Hare & Meelheim, supra
note 9, at 92 n.56 (discusses present status of prejudgment interest in England noting
statutory allowance for prejudgment interest and reversing earlier common-law).
58. 236 Minn. 104, 51 N.W.2d 831 (1952).
59. Id. at 108, 51 N.W.2d at 834. In allowing plaintiff to recover interest from the
date of completion of the well, the Lacey court focused on a breach of contract to furnish
labor and materials for well-drilling operations. The plaintiff used expert testimony to
establish the reasonable value of the services and equipment rented. Id. at 108, 51 N.W.2d
at 831. Accord Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1971)
(plaintiff itemized claims and was awarded interest on those items that were not discre-
tionary); Polaris Indus. v. Plastics, Inc., 299 N.W.2d 414 (Minn. 1981) (plaintiff made a
compelling case for obtaining prejudgment interest because it kept detailed records that
could be a reasonable measurement for ascertaining the amount of damages claimed). See
also Iten Leasing Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 684 F.2d 573, 576 (8th Cir. 1982) (computer
leasing damages); Taylor v. Raygo, Inc., 680 F.2d 1223, 1224 (8th Cir. 1982) (computer
leasing damages dispute); Strouth v. Wilkison, 302 Minn. 297, 300, 224 N.W.2d 511, 513
(1974) (breach of contract suit by homeowner against contractor).
1983]
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rented.6 0 It is significant that the dispute in Lacey centered on the
amount of damages claimed by plaintiff, rather than whether the defend-
ant was liable,6t because the Minnesota Supreme Court is more willing
to award prejudgment interest to plaintiff when the defendant has con-
ceded liability.
6 2
After the Lacey decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court denied pre-
judgment interest in five cases using the liquidated-unliquidated rules.
In Moosbrugger v. McGraw-Edison Co. ,63 Alley Construction Co. v. State ,64 and
Keegan v. Fischer Construction Co. ,65 the court disallowed prejudgment in-
60. 236 Minn. 103, 108, 51 N.W.2d 831, 834 (1952).
61. Id. The Lacey court adopted a compensatory theory of recovery in stating that
"[w]here interest is considered solely in the light of compensation for the use by one of
another's funds, it should be more readily awarded." Id. For a discussion of the Laiey
court's comment that a bona fide dispute as to the amount of damages claimed should not
bar accrual of interest from the date of demand, see id. at 108, 51 N.W.2d at 834. See also
supra note 34 and accompanying text.
62. See infa notes 108-25 and accompanying text.
63. 284 Minn. 143, 160, 170 N.W.2d 72, 82 (1969) (buyer's action against seller for
breach of express and implied warranties, for negligent manufacuring, and for selling
faulty machines).
In Moosbrugger the Minnesota Supreme Court denied prejudgment interest because
the exact amount of damages owed could be ascertained only by a jury. Id. at 160, 179
N.W.2d at 83.
64. 300 Minn. 346, 353, 219 N.W.2d 922, 926-27 (1974) (construction contract). In
Altey all but a small portion of the damages were disputed and final computation of the
amount of damages owed could not be readily ascertained prior to rendition of the ver-
dict. Id. at 352-53, 219 N.W.2d at 926.
Alle.y is also important because the liquidated-unliquidated rules on prejudgment in-
terest were made applicable to the Minnesota statute on payment of interest to contractors
who work for the state highway system, MINN. STAT. § 161.322 (1982). 300 Minn. 346,
291 N.W.2d 922 (1974). The Alley court stated:
We cannot interpret the Minn. Stat. § 161.332 statute as narrowly as the state
contends [i.e. that the statute contemplates payment of interest only upon the
amount that the state admits it owes]. It is not their decision to admit liability
for an obligation which imposes the statutory interest obligation. Neither can we
construe the statute to say that any subsequent litigation automatically imposes
the interest obligation of the statute to the benefit of a successful litigant. We
hold that the statutory interest obligations apply only where the damages were
readily ascertainable by computation or reference to generally recognized standards such as
market value and not where the amount of damages depended upon contingencies or upon juy
discretion.
Id. at 353, 219 N.W.2d at 926-27 (emphasis added).
65. 302 Minn. 519, 223 N.W.2d 141 (1974) (construction contract). In Keegan the
jury had to determine the proper method of calculating the amount of balance due for the
removal of gravel. Id. at 519, 223 N.W.2d at 142. The Keegan opinion implies that if the
parties had stipulated in their contract the standard of measurement or method of calcula-
tion to be used to determine the damages owed for a breach of the contract, the court
would have allowed prejudgment interest. Id. The Keegan Court pointed out that "there
was evidence in the course of the trial indicating a dispute as to the proper method of
calculating the amount of the balance due for the removal of the gravel." Id. It was for
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terest because the dispute could be resolved only as a fact question by the
jury; therefore, the amount was unliquidated. In Moosbrugger, Alley, and
Keegan, the defendant could not know how much he had to pay until the
jury had assessed the damages.66 In Potter v. Hartzell Propeller, Inc. ,67 and
Bonhiver v. Graft,68 the court denied prejudgment interest because the
amount owed could not be determined with reference to any generally
recognized standard of measurement. 69 Both Potter and Bonhi'ver empha-
size the element of ascertainability under the liquidated-unliquidated
rules.
In Potter the court denied prejudgment interest because the amount
owed by defendant was not ascertainable by reference to any generally
recognized standard of measurement. 70 The Potter court reasoned that:
[A]lthough in both cases plaintiff actually suffers loss of use of his
money from the date of the wrongful act, for which loss he theoretically
should be compensated, it would nevertheless be unreasonable to re-
quire the defendant to compensate plaintiff for this loss where defend-
ant could not have readily determined the amount of damages himself
either by computation or reference to generally recognized standards
such as market value.
71
The Potter court reiterated one of the major principles underlying the
liquidated-unliquidated distinction: one who cannot ascertain the
amount of damages for which he might be held liable cannot be ex-
pected to tender payment and thereby stop the running of interest.
72
The court was unwilling to adopt the compensatory theory of recovery
and include interest as a measurement of the plaintiff's loss of use of his
money, 73 even though the Potter court expressly recognized that its hold-
66. See Moosbrugger v. McGraw-Edison Co., 284 Minn. 143, 160-61, 170 N.W.2d 72,
82-83 (1969); Alley Constr. Co. v. State, 300 Minn. 346, 353, 219 N.W.2d 922, 926-27
(1974); Keegan v. Fischer Constr. Co., 302 Minn. 519, 520, 223 N.W.2d 141, 142 (1974).
67. 291 Minn. 513, 189 N.W.2d 499 (1971).
68. 311 Minn. 111, 248 N.W.2d 291 (1976).
69. Bonhiver, 311 Minn. at 132-35, 248 N.W.2d at 304-05; Potter, 291 Minn. at 518,
189 N.W.2d at 504-05. The issue in Potter did not revolve around the defendant's liability
per se, rather it focused on the exact amount of damages that the defendant owed the
plaintiff. Id.; cf. Hueper v. Goodrich, 314 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Minn. 1982) (automotive
personal injury damages).
Where the issue of liability has been conceded, either by stipulation or admission, the
only issue in the case is the measurement of the damages. In this situation, the case for
allowing prejudgment interest to compensate the plaintiff for loss of the use of his money is
very strong. See infra notes 205, 219-35 and accompanying text.
70. 291 Minn. at 519, 189 N.W.2d at 504. The issue of prejudgment interest in Potter
did not revolve around the defendant's liability per se, rather it focused on the exact
amount of damages that the defendant owed the plaintiff. Id.
71. 291 Minn. at 518, 189 N.W.2d at 504. See also Comment, supra note 38 (general
discussion and critique of the Potter court's reasoning).
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ing would result in an injustice to the plaintiff.74
The Bonhiver court ostensibly relied on the Potter rationale to determine
if prejudgment interest should be allowed. The Bonhiver court stated that
"[tihe question is not whether the parties agreed on the amount of dam-
ages but whether the defendant could have determined the amount of his
potential liability from a generally recognized objective standard of mea-
surement such as a readily ascertainable market value."
75
The Moosbrugger, Alley, and Keegan cases underline the contingency ele-
ment of jury discretion under the liquidated-unliquidated rules.76 The
Potter and Bonhiver cases emphasize the contingency element of unas-
certainability of damages under the liquidated-unliquidated rules.7
7
Hence, if the claim is contingent, the damages are considered unliqui-
dated and interest does not accumulate prior to the date of the verdict.
More recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court has been willing to
award prejudgment interest. In ICC Leasing Corp. v. Midwestern Machinery
Co. 78 and Polaris Industries v. Plastics, Inc. ,79 the court found that the
plaintiffs could recover prejudgment interest because their damages
could be ascertained by reference to a recognized standard of
measurement.8 0
In ICC plaintiff sued for default on written agreements to purchase
certain equipment leased to the defendant. 8 1 The terms of the agree-
ment were specifically detailed and fixed to enable the defendant to de-
termine its obligation to pay the principal balance owed as of the date of
74. 291 Minn. at 518, 189 N.W.2d at 504.
75. Bonhiver v. Graff, 311 Minn. 111, 135, 248 N.W.2d 291, 305 (1976). In Bonhiver
the plaintiff, a receiver who represented the rights of creditors, sued accountants who neg-
ligently failed to discover fraud on the part of former corporate officers. Id. at 113-16, 248
N.W.2d at 294-96. The court summarized the general rules that Minnesota courts adopt
in dealing with the issue of prejudgment interest. See id. at 134-35, 248 N.W.2d at 304-05.
The amount of damages owed in Bonhiver was determined "to be that amount by which
the balance due and owing on allowed claims against the receivership exceeded the assets
of the receivership." Id. at 135, 248 N.W.2d at 305. The figure the reciever could garnish
from the defendant's assets was unascertainable until the total of allowed claims was de-
termined and the receiver had determined in what amounts those claims exceeded his
assets. Id.
The Bonhiver case involved a fraudulent misrepresentation that caused the plaintiffs
to be deprived of the use of their money, whereas neither the Potter case nor its progeny
dealt with the divesting of the plaintiff's use of money through fraud.
76. See Moosbrugger v. McGraw-Edison Co., 284 Minn. 143, 160, 170 N.W.2d 72, 82
(1969); Alley Constr. Co. v. State, 300 Minn. 346, 353, 219 N.W.2d 922, 926-27 (1974);
Keegan v. Fischer Constr. Co., 302 Minn. 519, 520, 223 N.W.2d 141, 142 (1974).
77. See Potter v. Hartzell Propeller, Inc., 291 Minn. 513, 518-19, 189 N.W.2d 499, 504
(1971); Bonhiver v. Graff, 311 Minn. 111, 134-35, 248 N.W.2d 291, 304-05 (1976).
78. 257 N.W.2d 551 (Minn. 1977).
79. 299 N.W.2d 414 (Minn. 1981).
80. See ICC Leasing Corp. v. Midwestern Mach. Co., 257 N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn.
1977); Polaris Indus. v. Plastics, Inc., 299 N.W.2d 414, 418 (Minn. 1980).
81. 257 N.W.2d 551, 552-53 (Minn. 1977).
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default.8 2 The ICC court held that, although the amount owed was for
an unliquidated amount,83 the claim could be "readily ascertained by
computation or by reference to a generally recognized objective standard
of measurement. '84 The claim, therefore, was liquidated and prejudg-
ment interest was proper.8 5 The ICC court's holding is premised on the
compensatory theory for recovery of prejudgment interest.8
6
The defendant in ICC argued that interest should be limited to the
legal rate of interest under the Minnesota statute8 7 to make the amount
certain.8 8 The ICC court agreed and reaffirmed the rule that if the par-
ties do not call for a higher rate of interest in their written agreement, the
legal rate of interest will be imposed.8 9
In the recent case of Polaris Industnes v. Plastics, Inc. ,90 the Minnesota
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's findings that prejudgment inter-
est should be denied because the damages were unliquidated and readily
ascertainable before trial.91 The trial court cited both the Alley and Pot-
ter opinions for support in denying interest.92 The Minnesota Supreme
Court found that the plaintiff made a "compelling case for obtaining
prejudgment interest." 93 The Polaris court noted that the jury's award
reflected item by item, the exact amount of out-of-pocket expenses Pola-
82. Id.
83. The amount of indebtedness was in controversy and the defendant argued that
the sum was unliquidated. Id. at 555-56. The ICC court agrees that the sum is unliqui-
dated but the readily ascertainable exception is applicable. Id. at 556. The ICC court also
reiterates the general principle underlying liquidated-unliquidated prejudgment interest
rules, that "[a] bona fide dispute as to the amount of damages should not bar the accrual
of interest in all circumstances or a plaintiff's right to interest would depend merely upon
the reasonableness of the defendant." Id.
84. Id. The ICC court was quoting the prejudgment interest formulation of Moos-
brugger v. McGraw-Edison Co., 248 Minn. 143, 170 N.W.2d 72 (1968).
85. Se supra notes 52-57, 110-127, and accompanying text for the liquidated-unliqui-
dated rule formulation in Minnesota.
86. 257 N.W.2d at 556 ("Mere difference of opinion as to the exact amount of dam-
ages was not sufficient to excuse Midwestern from compensating ICCfor loss of the use of its
money from July 1970 until judgment in 1975." (emphasis added)).
87. MINN. STAT. § 334.01 (1982). See supra note 8.
88. 257 N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn. 1977).
89. Id. Compare the ICC court's holding, however, with the recent property condem-
nation case of State v. Carney, 309 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. 1981), where the Carney court did
not limit the recovery to the legal rate of interest but awarded the plaintiff interest as if the
landowner had made a reasonable and prudent investment. Id. at 776. See MINN. STAT.
§ 334.01 (1981).
90. 299 N.W.2d 414 (Minn. 1980). The underlying claim in Polarn& focused on negli-
gence and breach of expressed and implied warranties of merchantability and fitness. Id.
at 416-17. The plaintiff's negligence resulted in the failure of more than 23,000 tanks of
which the plaintiff replaced 17,897. Plaintiff sought compensation for replacement and
shipping costs. Id. at 417-18.
91. Id. at 418.
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ris incurred in replacing the defective product. 94 The only apparent dif-
ference between allowing prejudgment interest in Polaris and denying
prejudgment interest in Alley and Potter is that Polaris kept records of the
expenses it incurred. 95 The plaintiff in Polaris also drafted submissions to
the jury for a specific amount that paralleled plaintiff's bookkeeping
records. Therefore, when the jury returned its verdict, the amounts ren-
dered were close enough to the plaintiff's actual out-of-pocket expenses
that the Polaris court found that the damages were liquidated and per-
mitted prejudgment interest to be included.96
The Polaris court distinguished its factual situation from Alle and
Keegan:
In [Alley and Keegan] there were numerous issues which required the
jury to resolve uncertain fact questions and to exercise considerable in-
dependent discretion in arriving at its award. In the instant case, al-
though the liability of defendant was by no means clear cut before
trial, the computation of damages was relatively uncomplicated, and in
our opinion, meets the test of being "readily ascertainable by
computation."
9 7
The Polaris court cited Alley and Keegan as cases involving jury discre-
tion. The court distinguished the Polaris situation as involving a compu-
tation or ascertainability issue. 98  Significantly, the Polaris court
overlooked Potter and Bonhiver which focused directly on the issue of
whether the damages were "readily ascertainable by computation."99
This omission is especially noteworthy because the trial court specifically
analyzed the Polaris situation in light of the Potter decision. 100
In both Potter and Polaris the exact amount of damages owed was not
fixed before trial because the jury, within its discretion, could vary the
amount that the plaintiff could recover t0 The only substantial differ-
ence between Potter and Polaris is that in Polaris the expenses incurred by
94. Id. at 418.
95. Id. The Alley and Keegan decisions focus only on the contract breaches, whereas
Potter and Polaris center on negligence and quasi-tort actions. See Alley Constr. Co. v.
State, 300 Minn. 346, 219 N.W.2d 922 (1974); Keegan v. Fischer Constr. Co., 302 Minn.
519, 223 N.W.2d 141 (1974); Potter v. Hartzell Propeller, Inc., 291 Minn. 513, 189
N.W.2d 499 (1971); Polaris Indus. v. Plastics, Inc., 299 N.W.2d 414 (Minn. 1980).
96. Polaris, 299 N.W.2d at 416-18.
97. Id. at 418.
98. Id. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
100. Polaris, 299 N.W.2d at 417. The Polaris court omitted analysis of the Potter case
which most closely parallels the Polaris factual and legal situation. This omission exempli-
fies the analytic difficulty of the prejudgment interest area. The consequence of the omis-
sion is a confusing and conflicting analysis.
101. See Potter, 291 Minn. at 518, 189 N.W.2d at 504 (the amount of loss could not be
ascertained until the jury had determined it); Polaris, 299 N.W.2d at 418 (court acknowl-
edges possibility of substantial imprecision in fixing an amount prior to trial that accu-
rately reflects out-of-pocket damages).
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the plaintiff were actual bookkeeping items, 102 whereas, in Potter the esti-
mates of damages made by plaintiff's and defendant's experts varied
from $90,000 to $95,000, although the jury assessed damages at
$66,000.103 In Polaris the defendant could not know exactly how much
he owed the plaintiff until after the jury verdict was rendered. Nonethe-
less, a rough approximation could have been made using the plaintiffs
records.1 0 4 The Polans court conceded "[t]here is merit to the concern
expressed by the trial court in attempting to weigh the results reached by
the jury against the possibility of substantial imprecision, in fixing prior
to trial an amount which accurately reflects [plaintiffs] out-of-pocket
damages."1o5
The Polaris court's willingness to overturn the trial court's findings and
award prejudgment interest where the Minnesota Supreme Court could
have readily denied interest,106 reflects a more liberal application of the
liquidated-unliquidated rules. O7 Plaintiffs can be forewarned by the Po-
laris decision that prejudgment interest may be allowed if a plaintiff can
present persuasively precise records and dates.
As the Minnesota case law on prejudgment interest illustrates, Minne-
sota uses a liquidated-unliquidated analysis. When a Minnesota court
examines prejudgment interest under the liquidated-unliquidated analy-
sis, the facts of the case must fall into one of the four combinations in-
volving liability and certainty of damages.
First, plaintiff may seek damages that are liquidated where the defend-
ant concedes liability. 108 Under these circumstances, plaintiff will be en-
titled to the amount of damages claimed. Defendant will be liable for
prejudgment interest from the date the claim became liquidated. The
date of liquidation is either the date of the loss, breach, or injury, or the
date plaintiff sought compensation.10 9 The argument for an award of
prejudgment interest is strongest in this situation because plaintiff is de-
prived of a fixed amount from the date of the injury and the defendant
could readily ascertain the amount owed the plaintiff. 10 The defendant
knows the exact amount of damages he owes and is capable of tendering
102. Set Polans, 299 N.W.2d at 418 (Minn. 1981).
103. Potter, 291 Minn. at 519, 189 N.W.2d at 504 (jury based its verdict on the market
value for the aircraft).
104. Polaris, 299 N.W.2d at 417-18.
105. Id. at 418.
106. The Po/anr court was not willing to recognize how closely the facts in Polan's par-
alleled the facts in Potter despite the trial court's perception of this fact.
107. The Polaris opinion illustrates the Minnesota Supreme Court's case-by-case ap-
proach to the prejudgment interest issue.
108. See D. DoBBS, supra note 1, § 3.5, at 166; C. MCCoRMICK, supra note 1, at § 54;
Comment, supra note 2, at 521-23.
109. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 58; Comment, supra note 2, at 521-23.
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damages on the date of request. Minnesota courts have agreed that
where the defendant concedes liability and the amount of damages
sought by plaintiff is liquidated, the defendant owes plaintiff prejudg-
ment interest. II
Second, defendant may concede liability but the damages owed may
not be readily ascertainable by an objective standard of measurement.112
The common-law rule adopted by the Minnesota courts is that where
defendant could not tender payment and halt the running of interest, he
should not be required to pay interest on the claim until a jury or court
has determined the precise amount owed." 3 Under these circumstances,
Minnesota does not award prejudgment interest.14 Other courts, using
the compensatory theory, award prejudgment interest because the de-
fendant has conceded that he is liable for whatever amount is owed and
the plaintiff is deprived of the use of his money or his property." 1 5 The
fact that the defendant cannot tender payment does not eliminate the
plaintiff's deprivation of the use of his money or property." 6 If Minne-
sota courts adopt the compensatory theory of recovery for prejudgment
interest, interest would be included regardless of whether the defendant
could tender or not.
Third, defendant may deny all liability but the trier of fact may hold
him liable for prejudgment interest if the amount owed is certain."
7
Courts, both in Minnesota and in other jurisdictions,18 uniformly view
this combination as a liquidated claim and award prejudgment interest
if there is liability.' '9 The general rule is that a bona fide dispute about
whether the debt is actually owed will not render an otherwise liquidated
claim unliquidated.120
Fourth, defendant may deny liability and contend that damages are
11. This is known as the tender rule. See Cox v. McLaughlin, 76 Cal. 60, 67-72, 18 P.
100, 104 (1888); Comment, supra note 38, at 743 n.24 (discussing tender rule in Poler).
112. See D. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 3.5 at 165; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 56
(1935); 22 AM. JUR. 2D.Damages § 185 (1965).
113. See Moosbrugger v. McGraw-Edison Co., 284 Minn. 143, 160, 170 N.W.2d 72, 82
(1969); Comment, supra note 38, at 743. See also D. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 3.5, at 165
(general rule).
114. See Moosbrugger v. McGraw-Edison Co., 284 Minn. at 160, 170 N.W.2d at 82.
115. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., Essex House v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 978, 995
(S.D. Ohio 1975) ("we think that prejudgment interest may be justified, even on an unliq-
uidated claim 'by the need for adequate compensation so as to make the injured party
whole' "); see also Ramey v. Cincinnati Enquiry, Inc., 508 F.2d 1188, 1198 (6th Cir. 1974)
(compensation theory noted) ceri. denied 422 U.S. 1048 (1975); Schaefer & Assoc., P.A. v.
Schirmer, 3 Kan. App. 2d 114 , 590 P.2d 1087, 1092 (1979) (compensation theory
noted).
117. See 22 AM. JUR. 2DDamages § 186 (1965).
118. See Lacey v. Duluth, M. & Iron Range Ry., 236 Minn. 104, 108, 51 N.W.2d 831,
834 (1952).
119. See id.
120. For cases stating that a bona fide dispute does not bar a recovery for a liquidated
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not fixed, certain, or readily ascertainable by reference to an objective
standard.' 2 1 Jurisdictions that adhere strictly to the liquidated-unliqui-
dated distinction disallow prejudgment interest in this situation because
the question of liability and the amount of liability are uncertain.
Courts base their rationale on the tender argument 122 or the punitive
theory of recovery.' 23 If ultimately the defendant is found liable for
plaintiff's damages from the date of the injury or breach, the plaintiff has
been deprived ofjust compensation from the date of the injury or breach.
Where there is no award for prejudgment interest, the defendant is un-
justly enriched, while the plaintiff is only partially compensated.1
2 4
Minnesota trial courts should analyze a prejudgment interest case on
its individual factors and not on a rigid application of the common-law
liquidated-unliquidated distinction that can result in unjust, partial
recoveries. 125
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A. Introduction
Other jurisdictions have approached the issue of prejudgment interest
without following the liquidated-unliquidated distinction. During the
past decade, the trend toward allowing prejudgment interest was evi-
denced by three significant legislative and judicial developments. 126
State legislatures have enacted statutes which require interest to be in-
cluded in damages as a matter of law.' 2 7 Courts have moved toward a
more lenient interpretation and application of prejudgment interest
common-law rules and statutes.' 28 The New Jersey and Pennsylvania
claim, see Broward County v. Sattler, 400 So. 2d 1031, 1033 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). See
also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 54, at 215 (dispute does not bar liquidated claim).
121. See D. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 3.5 at 165-66; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at
§§ 56-57; 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages §§ 181, 185, 189 (1965).
122. See supra note 111.
123. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
124. See Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 359, 307 A.2d 571, 575,appeal dismissed, 414 U.S.
1106 (1973).
125. Other courts have noted the problem. See, e.g., Bernhard v. Rochester German
Ins. Co., 79 Conn. 288, 65 A. 134 (1906); Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 359, 307 A.2d 571,
575, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1106 (1973); Laudenberger v. Port Auth., 496 Pa. 52, 63,
436 A.2d 147, 153 (1981), appeal dismissed sub nom. Bucheit v. Laudenberger, 102 S. Ct.
2002 (1982).
126. See generally Hare & Meelheim, supra note 9; Loggans, Aviation Litigation: The Case
for Prejudgment Interest, 17 TRIAL, Jan. 1981, at 26.
127. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.280 (1973); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-101 (Supp.
1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-2016 (1981); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 5000a-6 (McKinney
1963); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-04 (1976).
128. Michigan courts no longer follow the interest on the judgment statute when nec-
essary to fully compensate the plaintiff by awarding prejudgment interest. MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 600.6455 (1968); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.6455 (Callaghan 1974). See Bass
v. Spitz, 522 F. Supp. 1343, 1354 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (citing Banish v. City of Hamtramck,
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supreme courts promulgated rules which award prejudgment interest in
certain circumstances.129 Each of these developments will be examined
briefly.
Ten states have enacted statutes that allow the award of prejudgment
interest in contract and tort actions.130 At least two states award pre-
judgment interest as a matter of right.131 Two more states leave the issue
of interest to the jury's discretion.132 The trend toward the enactment of
prejudgment interest statutes coincides with progressive activity in the
courts in awarding interest, which occurs frequently in torts and unliqui-
dated contract actions.133 The Alaska case of State v. Pht'li's 134 and the
West Virginia case of Bondv. Cit of Huntington 135 exemplify this current
court activity.
B. Prejudgment Interest Awarded under a Statutory Analysis Approach
Alaska is one of the first jurisdictions to address the need for updating
and renovating the narrow common-law rules regarding the award of
prejudgment interest in tort actions. In 1965 the Alaska legislature
amended the interest statute applicable to actions against the state.1
36
9 Mich. App. 381, 398-400, 157 N.W.2d 445, 453-54 (1968) (where the Michigan Court of
Appeals held that interest may be recovered as an element of damages whenever necessary
to provide adequate compensation)). The Bass and Banish opinions addressed the judi-
cial/administrative issue of unnecessary delays that cost the plaintiff. The courts were
concerned also with fully compensating the plaintiff for loss of use of his money or prop-
erty. See Bass, 522 F. Supp. at 1354.
In Hawaii, the supreme court adopted a rule which allows prejudgment interest be-
cause there was no statute expressly forbidding prejudgment interest. See Lucas v. Leggitt
& Myers Tobacco Co., 51 Hawaii 346, 350, 461 P.2d 140, 144 (1969).
In Iowa, the supreme court broadly interpreted the Iowa wrongful death statute to
include prejudgment interest. See Wetz v. Thorpe, 215 N.W.2d 350, 358 (Iowa 1974). For
an article on awarding prejudgment interest in the area of wrongful death actions, see
Annot., 96 A.L.R.2D 1103 (1964).
129. See infra notes 190-223 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 18, 20.
131. See, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3287 (West 1970) (interest on damages as a statutory right
to recovery); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-101 (Supp. 1981), construed in, Stemple v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 430 F.2d 178, 184 (10th Cir. 1970) (interest must be applied to any judg-
ment resulting from an action for personal injuries).
132. See, CAL. CIv. CODE § 3288 (West 1970) (interest on noncontractual damages,
discretion of the jury); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAw § 5000(a) (McKinney 1963).
133. See Hare & Meelheim, supra note 9, at 91-92 (supporting tort action).
134. 470 P.2d 266 (Alaska 1970).
135. 276 S.E.2d 539 (W. Va. 1981). Other cases might have been chosen as illustrative
of recent developments in the area of awarding prejudgment interest. For example, an
analysis of court rulings in Wisconsin or Iowa reaffirms the courts' more lenient interpreta-
tions and applications of the common-law prejudgment interest rules. See Wetz v.
Thorpe, 215 N.W.2d 350 (Iowa 1974); Dahl v. Housing Auth., 54 Wis.2d 22, 194 N.W.2d
618 (1972) (citing Laycock v. Parker, 103 Wis. 161, 179, 79 N.W. 327, 332 (1899)).
136. See Act of Mar. 24, 1965, L. 30, § 2, 1965 Alaska Sess. Laws 16, 17. Before 1965,
the "prevailing party in an action against the State of Alaska was entitled to interest 'only
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The amendment allows interest to be awarded for periods prior to the
date of the judgment.137 The legislature intended that prejudgment in-
terest be awarded more liberally than prior judicial interpretations had
allowed. t38 The first major case to test the breadth of the Alaska legal
rate of interest statute was State v. Philltps. t 39
In Phlhps, the Alaska Supreme Court did not follow the traditional
liquidated-unliquidated distinction.140 Rather, the court found that the
legal rate of interest statute expressly asserted that interest must be
awarded from the date the cause of action accrued, which is when the
damages are "due."' 14 1 The Alaska Supreme Court reasoned that grant-
ing prejudgment interest was a means of making the plaintiff whole142
and that "denying interest on unliquidated damages erroneously subor-
dinates plaintiff's interest in full compensation to a feeling that defend-
ant should not be penalized for failing promptly to pay an uncertain
amount."t43 The Phillips court also noted that "the award of prejudg-
ment interest encourages early settlement and discourages defendants
from using delay between injury and judgment to defeat a legitimate
demand."144
The strength of the Phi/lps decision lies in its interpretation of the
legal rate of interest statute. The court held that prejudgment interest is
not mandatory, and the trial court may use its discretion to deny pre-
judgment interest in a particular case.' 45 The court commented, "All
damages then, whether liquidated or unliquidated, pecuniary or non-
from the date of judgment'. " State v. Phillips, 470 P.2d 266, 272 (Alaska 1970). The
Philips court analyzed the expansion of granting prejudgment interest in the area of con-
tracts and torts when the amount became "due" under ALAsKA STAT. § 09.50.280 (1973)
which reads: "Ifjudgment is rendered for the plaintiff, it shall be for the legal amount
found due from the state with legal interest from the date it became due and without
punitive damages." Id. This prejudgment interest statute does not delineate between a
contract or tort action against the state, but only whether the damages awarded became
"due" prior to the judgment being rendered. The Phillps court applied this statute in a
wrongful death action against the state. See 470 P.2d at 272-73.
137. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.280 (1973).
138. See State v. Phillips, 470 P.2d at 272-73.
139. 470 P.2d 266 (Alaska 1970).
140. See id. at 273.
141. 470 P.2d at 272. See also supra note 136. Under this statutory interpretation, the
Philips court awarded prejudgment interest in a wrongful death action from the date of.
the death because that is when the cause of action became "due." Id. at 272-73.
142. 470 P.2d at 274.
143. d. at 273 n.27.
144. Id. at 274 n.27. The Phillps court quoted from the Harvard and Stanford law
reviews. See id. at 273 n.27. The Ph'ltps court also stated: "We are influenced by the
policy consideration that failure to award prejudgment interest creates a substantial
financial incentive for defendants to litigate even where liability is so clear and the jury
award so predictable that they should settle." Id. at 274. See In re Air Crash Disaster
Near Chicago, 480 F. Supp. 1280, 1286 (N.D. Ill. 1979),af'd, 644 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1981).
145. 470 P.2d at 274.
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pecuniary, should carry interest from the time the cause of action ac-
crues, unless for some reason peculiar to an individual case such an award of interest
would do an injustice. "146 The Phillips decision is pivotal because the court
allowed prejudgment interest on the rationale of just compensation and
judicial expediency for swift resolution of lawsuits, rather than a rigid
adherence to the traditional liquidated-unliquidated common-law
distinction. 147
In 1973, the Alaska Supreme Court in Davis v. Chism 148 examined the
inclusion of prejudgment interest in an "offer of judgment" or a pre-trial
settlement offer.149 The Ch'sm court held that prejudgment interest is
similar in nature to compensatory damages,150 and that when an offer of
judgment contains only a single figure then " [that figure] would include
all sums which the defendant believes will fairly compensate the plaintiff
for all damages sustained, including the damage resulting from depriva-
tion of the use of the money between the date of the cause of action
accrued and the date of the offer."151 After Chism, it is imperative in
Alaska that a plaintiff calculate the amount of prejudgment interest he is
entitled to prior to accepting the offer of judgment. If the plaintiff ac-
cepts a single lump sum as an offer of judgment, the court will assume
that the plaintiff has included prejudgment interest in the total offer. 152
In Guin v. Ha,153 the Alaska Supreme Court followed the compensation
rationale established in Phillips and Chism. 154 The Gu'n court held that
defendants in tort actions have the obligation to pay prejudgment inter-
146. Id. (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 273.
148. 513 P.2d 475 (Alaska 1973).
149. Id. at 480-82. The Chism opinion is a rare instance of a court discussing the issue
of whether prejudgment interest should be included in a pre-trial settlement.
150. Id. at 481. The Chism court commented on prejudgment interest being a form of
compensatory damages:
The reason for awarding pre-judgment interest is that money is worth less the
later it is received. Plaintiff is entitled to the amount to which he has been dam-
aged by the defendant from the date his cause of action accrued. Thus it may be
argued that plaintiff was entitled to the use of that amount from the same date,
and the use of that money has real economic value, of which the plaintiff has
been deprived. In this sense, pre-judgment interest is necessary to compensate
the plaintiff, not only for the amount by which he has suffered damages in the




152. Id. at 480-82. Plaintiffs should require defendants to divide the offer of judgment
into separate parts, with the amount for prejudgment interest specifically delineated. For
similar reasons, plaintiffs should require the use of the special verdict in jury trials. See
Sebring v. Colver, 649 P.2d 932, 936 (Alaska 1982) (no prejudgment interest awarded
where jury verdict incorporated damages for the financial impact of the passage of time).
153. 591 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1979).
154. Id. at 1286-87.
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est from the date of injury.155
In a recent prejudgment interest case, City ofJuneau v. Commercial Union
Insurance Co. ,156 the Alaska Supreme Court reaffirmed the Phillips ration-
ale by holding that the purpose of the prejudgment interest is to place
the plaintiff in the same position as if he had been immediately compen-
sated for his loss. 15 7 The City ofJuneau court held that prejudgment inter-
est was not a remedial or procedural device.158 Rather, prejudgment
interest is a substantive right of an injured party to recover for economic
loss occasioned by his inability to use the award of damages between the
injury and the judgment. 159 This rationale is applicable to both contract
and tort actions without regard to whether the damages are liquidated or
unliquidated.160
The national trend toward a more lenient application of the common-
law prejudgment interest rules also can be seen in the recent West Vir-
ginia case of Bond v. Ciy of Huntington.16 1 As in Phillips, the issue before
the Bond court was whether prejudgment interest could be awarded in a
wrongful death action. 16 2 To decide this issue, the Bond court distin-
guished between allowing interest from the date of the verdict under the
statutory law163 and the award of interest as a form of damages under
the court's discretion in equity. 164 The West Virginia Supreme Court
also divided damages in a personal injury case into three separate catego-
ries: compensation for non-pecuniary loss (such as disfigurement, pain
and suffering, and mental anguish), compensation for pecuniary loss
(such as medical and hospital expenses), and compensation for loss of
future pecuniary damages. 165 The Bond court held that "a rule permit-
ting additional damages by way of compensatory interest on pecuniary
losses incurred prior to trial in personal injury actions, as well as in
wrongful death claims is consistent" with the West Virginia interest on
the verdict statute.166 Interest awarded from date of the verdict is set by
statute in West Virginia, whereas interest as compensatory damages is set
155. Id. at 1284.
156. 598 P.2d 957 (Alaska 1979).
157. Id. at 959.
158. 598 P.2d at 959.
159. Id.
160. See Phillips, 470 P.2d at 273-74.
161. 276 S.E.2d 539 (W. Va. 1981).
162. Id. at 546; accord Wetz v. Thorpe, 215 N.W.2d 350 (Iowa 1974) (wrongful death
action).
163. 276 S.E.2d at 549.
164. See id. at 548-49.
165. See id. at 547-48. This division of personal injury damages is a common approach
used to decide when to award or deny prejudgment interest. See D. DOBBS, supra note 1,
§ 3.5, at 165-67; C. MCCORMCK, supra note 1, at § 56; 22 AM. JUR. 2DDamages §§ 189-91
(1965). See also Lovell v. Marianna Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 267 Ark. 164, 167, 589 S.W.2d
577, 578 (1979) (adopting a similar division of personal injury damages).
166. 276 S.E.2d at 549.
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by the court. 16 7 With this distinction in mind, the Bond court ruled that
prejudgment interest is a form of damages.168 The court did not allow
prejudgment interest for future pecuniary losses, current non-pecuniary
losses, or punitive damages. 69 The Bond court concluded that where
there is ascertainable pecuniary loss, the allowance of interest is to fully
compensate the injured party for the loss of funds expended.
170
The Bond decision has special import for Minnesota because Minne-
sota has an interest on the verdict statute similar to West Virginia.1
71
The West Virginia Supreme Court was willing to expand the common-
law prejudgment interest rules to encompass certain pecuniary losses in-
curred prior to trial as a form of additional damages.
C Prejudgment Interest Awarded under a Calculation of Damages Approach
In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago 172 is a pivotal case in the trend
toward allowing prejudgment interest in tort actions.'17 The Federal Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that plaintiffs were
entitled to prejudgment interest in a wrongful death action under Cali-
fornia, Wisconsin, and Illinois law. 174 The Air Crash court reasoned that
the plaintiffs should be awarded prejudgment interest despite the pres-
ence of multiple defendants. 175 Because large amounts of money were at
issue, equitable considerations warranted the availability of prejudgment
interest as an incentive for the defendants to pay plaintiffs promptly. 176
The court was concerned also with the swift resolution of plaintiffs' law-
suit. 1 77 The court based its decision on the Illinois wrongful death stat-
167. Id. at 549.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 547.
171. Compare W. VA. CODE § 56-6-27 (1966) with MINN. STAT. § 549.09 (1982) (both
statutes allow interest to be calculated from the date of the verdict rather than the more
traditional date of the judgment); see also supra note 17 and accompanying text.
172. 480 F. Supp. 1280 (N.D. Ill. 1979), aff'd, 644 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1981).
173. Prior to In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, no federal district court had at-
tempted to address the problems of court congestion, delay, and postponements of claims
that legitimately should be settled before trial by allowing prejudgment interest to be
awarded as a measurement of damages. This result was not substantially affected by the
appellate court's holding. See nfra notes 181-89 and accompanying text. For a good dis-
cussion of the Air Crash case, see Note, Pre'udgment Interest.- An Element of Full Compensation in
Wrongful Death Cases, 1981 U. ILL. L. REv. 453, 475-83.
174. 480 F. Supp. at 1283.
175. Id. at 1284.
176. See id. at 1285.
177. The court reasoned:
This Court's primary responsibility is to insure the fair, just, and speedy disposi-
tion of cases. Meeting this responsibility is an increasingly difficult task as new,
unexpected problems arise and more complex and multifaceted cases face the
courts. Courts frequently discover that traditional solutions to traditional
problems do not always work when applied in unusual cases. Fortunately, our
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ute stating that prejudgment interest is "an essential element of 'fair and
just compensation.' "178 The Air Crash decision is significant because the
trial court overlooked precedent which disallowed prejudgment interest
in tort actions. Instead, the court wanted to expedite settlements and
speed the fair and just disposition of cases. 179 The decision is also impor-
tant for its persuasive argument that prejudgment interest should be
awarded in personal injury tort actions under the compensatory theory
of recovery. 180
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the dis-
trict court's reliance on other jurisdictions' interpretation of their wrong-
ful death statutes based on a "fair and just compensation" approach was
unfounded. 18 The court of appeals ruled that the district court was lim-
ited to construing plaintiff's case in light of the Illinois wrongful death
statute and Illinois case law, rather than examining California or Wis-
consin law.182 The appellate court also held that the Illinois prejudg-
ment interest statute allowing interest on money withheld by
"unreasonably and vexatious delay" of payment was inapplicable as a
basis for decision in this case.18 3 The only basis, therefore, for the district
court to allow prejudgment interest was under the Illinois wrongful
death statute.' 8 4 Plaintiff was unable to cite authority for the proposi-
tion that prejudgment interest should be awarded under the Illinois
wrongful death statute. 18 5 The appellate court, however, distinguished
the only case applicable and allowed prejudgment interest as a measure-
ment of compensatory damages in wrongful death actions under Illinois
law. 186
The result obtained by the appellate court is substantially the same as
that of the district court. Even though the district court used the "fair
system is not static, but is adaptable to changing needs and extraordinary
situations.
Id. at 1287.
178. Id. at 1286.
179. Id. at 1286-88.
180. Id. at 1285-86. The court noted that the defendants knew one of them was liable
and that plaintiffs' losses were calculable. Given the large amounts due in damages, there
was "a real incentive for the defendants to delay payment." Id at 1285. The court
concluded:
The losses suffered by the decedent's survivors arise at the moment of the dece-
dent's death; the award of judgment in a subsequent wrongful death suit is
merely an exposifado determination of a preexisting obligation. Unlessprejudg-
ment interest is available, the survivors suffer the additional loss of the income
from the damages they incurred on the date of death.
Id. at 1286 (citations omitted).
181. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 644 F.2d 633, 637-38 (7th Cir. 198i).
182. See id.
183. Id at 638.
184. Id. at 638-39.
185. Id. at 640.
186. See id. at 639-41.
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and just compensation theory" and the appellate court adopted a calcu-
lation of pecuniary damages approach, the result reached under both
analyses is identical. 8 7 The appellate court conceded this point when it
stated, "Prejudgment interestperse is not allowable [in Illinois] as a sepa-
rate element of the wrongful death damages award, but use of interest is
implicit in the calculation of the present value of the plaintiff's pecuniary
loss as of the date of trial."188
In summarizing the impact of either Air Crash decision, it is significant
that the courts were willing to adapt the wrongful death statute to meet
the need for current application of the prejudgment interest rules which
further just compensation and judicial efficiency at a time when federal
courts are severely congested.189
D. Prejudgment Interest Awarded under a Court-Promulgated Rule Approach
Another approach to the revision of common-law rules on prejudg-
ment interest is the enactment by state supreme courts of court-promul-
gated rules.190 New Jersey and Pennsylvania followed this approach and
enacted prejudgment interest rules governing personal injury actions. 19'
In 1971, the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted a rule, pursuant to its
rule-making powers, that the trial court must award prejudgment inter-
187. See infra note 180 and accompanying text. The district court's rationale was criti-
cized on appeal; however, the substance of the plaintiff's argument for "fair and just com-
pensation" was left intact by the appellate court.
188. 644 F.2d at 641. The appellate court noted:
We realize that the district court characterized the adjustment award as interest
rather than an adjustment of the "present value at death" calculation. But it
seems clear from the instructions themselves that full compensation was what
was intended .... The so-called "prejudgment interest" is just an element of
the formula for calculation of the compensatory damages.
Id. at 645-46. Apparently in a case like Air Crash, where the largest amount of damages
sought are for compensation the appellate court's fine distinction, between not allowing
prejudgment interest outright but awarding compensatory damages and including interest
from the date of the loss, will have little effect on the final result. As conceded by the
appellate court, "In other words, the outcome here, after discounting to the date of death
and adding prejudgment interest, is substantially the same outcome as if damages had
been correctly computed by calculating present value at the date of trial." Id. at 646. The
appellate court's decision changed the formula used and not the result; both the district
and appellate courts awarded prejudgment interest to the plaintiffs.
189. See 480 F. Supp. at 1286-88. See also Laudenberger v. Port Auth., 496 Pa. 52, 58-
61, 436 A.2d 147, 150-52 (1981), (court takes judicial notice of delay problem and allows
prejudgment interest as a remedy), appeal di missed sub noma. Bucheit v. Laudenberger, 102
S.Ct. 2002 (1982). Hare & Meelheim, supra note 9, at 89-90.
190. See Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 307 A.2d 571, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1106
(1973); Laudenberger v. Port Auth., 496 Pa. 52, 436 A.2d 147 (1981), appeal dlsmised sub
noma. Bucheit v. Laudenberger, 102 S.Ct. 2002 (1982).
191. See PA. R.C.P. 238 (1979); N.J.R. 4:42-11(B) (1982); See also Laudenberger v. Port
Auth., 496 Pa. 52, 436 A.2d 147 (1981), appeal dismissed sub noma. Buckeit v. Laudenberger
102 S.Ct. 2002 (1982).
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est.19 2 This rule was challenged in Busik v. Levine 193 as being a matter of
substantive law and beyond the constitutional grant to the New Jersey
Supreme Court of its power "to make rules governing. . . the practice
and procedure" for New Jersey courts.'9 4 Busik argued that the New
Jersey Supreme Court "trespassed upon the legislative domain in adopt-
ing the rule, in breach of the principal of separation of powers .... "195
Although interest is generally of statutory origin in the United States,196
the contrary has been true in New Jersey.19 7 New Jersey has no statute
dealing with interest on contracts, claims, or judgments.' 98 The Bustk
court emphasized that the controlling law on the award of prejudgment
interest has always been court promulgated.199 For the New Jersey
Supreme Court to enact a specific rule on the award of prejudgment
interest in tort actions, therefore, was not unique.
20 0
The significance of the Busik decision is the court's reliance on equity
and justice to dictate the award of prejudgment interest.2 01 Rather than
following established common-law rules as in Philips and Bond, the Buszk
court stated:
Interest is not punitive . . . ; here it is compensatory, to indemnify the
claimant for the loss of what the moneys due him would presumably
192. NJ.R. 4:42-11 (1982). The New Jersey rule states:
Interest: Rate on Judgments; in Tort Actions
(a) Rate. Judgments, awards and orders for the payment of money and
taxed costs shall bear simple interest on the amount of the award at 12% per
annum from the date of entry, except as otherwise ordered by the court and
except as may be otherwise provided by law.
(b) Tort Actions. Except where provided by statute with respect to a pub-
lic entity or employee, and except as otherwise provided by law, the court shall,
in tort actions, including products liability actions, include in the judgment sim-
ple interest at 12% per annum on the amount of the award from the date of the
institution of the action or from a date 6 months after the date the cause of
action arises, whichever is later, provided that in exceptional cases the court may
suspend the running of such prejudgment interest. The contingent fee of an
attorney shall not be computed on the interest so included in the judgment.
Id.
193. 63 NJ. 351, 307 A.2d 571,appealdismssd, 414 U.S. 1106 (1973). See also 10 SE-
TON HALL L. REV. 200 (1979) (brief casenote on Busik).
194. Id. at 355, 307 A.2d at 573.
195. Id.




200. See id. at 357, 307 A.2d at 573-74.
201. The New Jersey Supreme Court held in Busik that the rule which authorized
prejudgment interest in tort actions was appropriate in the consideration of injustice for
litigants and to minimize problems ofjudicial management arising from delay if prejudg-
ment interest is denied. See id. at 359-360, 307 A.2d at 575.76. The Buslk court also held
that the prejudgment interest rule sufficiently relates to "practice and procedure" and it
was properly adopted pursuant to the New Jersey Supreme Court's rule-making powers.
See id. at 361-68, 307 A.2d at 577-80.
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have earned if payment had not been delayed. . . . [The limitation
disallowing prejudgment interest] apparently rested upon the view that
a defendant should not be deemed in default when the amount of his
liability has not been adjudged. But interest is payable on a liquidated
claim when liability itself is denied, even in good faith. [citation omit-
ted]. The fact remains that in both situations the defendant has had
the use, and the plaintiff has not, of moneys which the judgment finds
was the damage plaintiff suffered. This is true whether the contested
liability is for a liquidated or for an unliquidated sum.
202
The Busik opinion emphasizes the weakness of the traditional liqui-
dated-unliquidated rules and favors a more equitable resolution based on
court-promulgated rules.203 The court was not willing to expand the con-
cept of a "liquidated" sum to find a basis for an award of interest.
20 4
Enactment of the prejudgment interest rule by the Busik court was an
attempt to combat the special inducement for delay inherent without a
prejudgment interest rule of some form.
2° 5
Pennsylvania is the only other state to adopt a court-promulgated rule
that allows the award of prejudgment interest in tort actions.206 In 1978
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court enacted a rule awarding prejudgment
interest where the plaintiff receives a jury verdict in excess of 125% of the
settlement offer made by the defendant prior to trial.207 The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the court-
202. Id. at 358-59, 307 A.2d at 575.
203. See id. at 359, 397 A.2d at 575.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 359-60, 307 A.2d at 576. See also Laudenberger v. Port Auth., 496 Pa. 52,
64, 436 A.2d 147, 153 (1981) (court notes that prejudgment interest rule was enacted to
combat the problem of delay), appeal dimissedsub noma. Bucheit v. Laudenberger, 102 S.Ct.
2002 (1982).
206. See Laudenberger v. Port Auth., 496 Pa. 52, 63, 436 A.2d 147, 153 (1981) (New
Jersey only other state which also possesses a judicial rule of prejudgment interest), appeal
dismi sedsub noma. Bucheit v. Laudenberger, 102 S.Ct. 2002 (1982).
207. Id. at 56, 436 A.2d at 149. Rule 238 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure
states:
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (e), in an action seeking monetary relief
for bodily injury, death or property damage, or any combination thereof, the
court or the arbitrators appointed under the Arbitration Act of June 16, 1836,
P.L. 715, as amended, 5 P.S. § 30 et seq., or the Health Care Services Malprac-
tice Act of October 15, 1975, P.L. 390, 40 P.S. § 1301.101 et seq., shall
(1) add to the amount of compensatory damages in the award of the
arbitrators, in the verdict of a jury, or in the court's decision in a nonjury
trial, damages for delay at ten (10) percent per annum, not compounded,
which shall become part of the award, verdict or decision;
(2) compute the damages for delay from the date the plaintiff filed
the initial complaint in the action or from a date one year after the accrual
of the cause of action, whichever is later, up to the date of the award, ver-
dict or decision.
(b) In arbitration under the Act of 1836, the amount of damages for delay
shall not be included in determining whether the amount in controversy is
within the jurisdiction of the arbitrators.
(c) Except as provided in subdivision (e), damages for delay shall be ad-
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promulgated rule in Laudenberger v. Port Authorty',.208 The court based its
rationale on the court's constitutional powers and public policy. 20 9 The
appellees in Laudenberger argued that the rule involved a substantive right
which was beyond the procedural rule-making authority of the supreme
court.2 1 0 The Laudenberger court analyzed the promulgated rule ap-
proach adopted by the New Jersey court for prejudgment interest and
found "there is no substantive distinction between New Jersey and Penn-
sylvania with respect to the judicial procedural rule-making author-
ity."21 1  Therefore, when the New Jersey rule was found
constitutional,212 as a procedural and not substantive rule, the
Laudenberger court also found the Pennsylvania prejudgment interest rule
constitutional.213 The appellees argued that the New Jersey case of Busik
ded to the award, verdict or decision against all defendants found liable, no mat-
ter when joined in the action.
(d) The court may, and on request of a party shall, charge the jury that if
it finds for the plaintiff, it shall not award the plaintiff any damages for delay
because this is a matter for the court.
(e) If a defendant at any time prior to trial makes a written offer of settle-
ment in a specified sum with prompt cash payment to the plaintiff, and contin-
ues that offer in effect until commencement of trial, but the offer is not accepted
and the plaintiff does not recover by award, verdict or decision, exclusive of
damages for delay, more than 125 percent of the offer, the court or the arbitra-
tors shall not award damages for delay for the period after the date the offer was
made.
(0 If an action is pending on the effective date of this rule, or if an action
is brought after the effective date on a cause of action which accrued prior to the
effective date, damages for delay shall be computed from the date plaintiff files
the initial complaint or from a date one year after the accrual of the cause of
action, or from a date six (6) months after the effective date of this rule, which-
ever date is later.
(g) This rule shall not apply to
(1) eminent domain proceedings
(2) pending actions in which damages for delay are allowable in the
absence of this rule.
208. 496 Pa. 52, 70, 436 A.2d 147, 157 (1981), appeal dismissed sub nom. Bucheit v.
Laudenberger, 102 S.Ct. 2002 (1982). For a plaintiff's view of the Laudenberger case, see
Prejudgment Interest, 26 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 82 (1982).
209. Laudenburger, 496 Pa. at 60, 436 A.2d at 151.
210. See id. at 64, 436 A.2d at 153-54.
211. Id. at 64, 436 A.2d at 154.
212. See supra notes 192-205 and accompanying text.
213. See Laudenburger, at 63-67, 436 A.2d at 153-55. The Laudenberger court reasoned:
Nonetheless, one can always argue, and not unconvincingly, that Rule 238 cre-
ates a new substantive right to interest in the plaintiff based upon a secondary,
derivative wrong perpetrated by the defendant in delaying settlement.
Undeniably, Rule 238 embodies both procedural and substantive elements.
Its purpose and effect are procedural, yet its performance will touch upon sub-
stantive rights of both parties. However, the fact that a rule does involve the
substantive rights of litigants should not mean that the rule is an inappropriate
topic for Supreme Court rule-making. Most rules of procedure will eventually
reverberate to the substantive rights and duties of those involved. . . . As we
have stated previously, the legislature is forbidden to act in the field of proce-
dure; we are bound to do so by the terms of authority. . . . Clearly, Rule 238,
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v. Levine 2 14 was inapplicable in Pennsylvania, because "historically, New
Jersey's rules concerning interest upon obligations, claims and judgments
have been judge-made. In Pennsylvania, on the other hand, interest on
verdicts and judgments has always been governed by statute."215 The
Laudenberger court dismissed this historical difference by pointing out that
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had also enacted court-promulgated
rules in the area of attorney fees which has been traditionally statu-
tory. 2 16 The court reasoned that allowing prejudgment interest is "sim-
ply another step in a continuum aimed at furthering litigation in a
meaningful way while protecting the rights of litigants."217
The Laudenberger court distinguished the scope of the court-promul-
gated New Jersey prejudgment interest rule from that of the Penn-
sylvania rule.218 The Pennsylvania prejudgment interest rule encourages
early disposition of tort litigation,219 whereas, under the New Jersey rule,
"[s]uccessful plaintiffs are compensated for delay whether they receive
and reject any reasonable settlement offers or not. There is no impetus to
the plaintiff to accept an early, yet reasonable settlement offer, since in-
terest continues to run after the time the offer is made." 220  The court
continued:
[The Pennsylvania rule] clearly reflects a primary desire to encourage
pre-trial settlement.... Undeniably, this rule serves to compensate
the plaintiff for the inability to utilize funds rightfully due him, but the
basic aim of the rule is to alleviate delay in the disposition of cases,
thereby lessening congestion in the courts. . . .Rule 238 fulfills this
Court's obligation to the legislature and to the public to effectuate
prompt, expeditious trial and settlement of cases.22 1
The Laudenberger opinion illustrates the willingness of some courts to
adopt prejudgment interest rules to promote pre-trial settlements and to
when viewed from the perspective of its purpose and goal, contributes to the
orderly and efficient administration of justice in Pennsylvania, and must stand.
Id. at 66-67, 436 A.2d at 155.
214. 63 N.J. 351, 307 A.2d 571, appeal dismnsed, 414 U.S. 1106 (1973).
215. Laudenberger, 496 Pa. at 64, 436 A.2d at 154.
216. See id. at 65, 436 A.2d at 154.
217. Id.
218. See id. at 59-60, 63-67, 436 A.2d at 151, 153-55.
219. Id. at 59-60, 436 A.2d at 151. The Laudenberger court commented that:
The restrictions placed on the Pennsylvania rule encourage early disposition of
tort litigation in a way that New Jersey's rule does not. In Pennsylvania, defend-
ants may protect themselves from exposure to prejudgment interest by making a
reasonable written settlement offer in a timely fashion. Should the plaintiff re-
ject it and not recover an award 25% greater than the offer, the defendant is
assessed interest only from the date on which the complaint is filed or one year
from the accrual of the action, whichever is later, up to the date of the settlement
offer. Thus, the format of Rule 238 is responsive to its fundamental goal of
prompting meaningful negotiations in major cases so as to unclutter the courts.
Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 59-61, 436 A.2d at 151-52.
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fairly and fully compensate plaintiffs.2 22 Recently enacted statutes and
court interpretations of the common-law rules on prejudgment interest
show that the trend toward allowing prejudgment interest is based on
theories of compensation and equity, rather than the common-law liqui-
dated-unliquidated distinction. The Minnesota courts should adopt a
multi-factor analysis to be utilized on a case-by-case basis. A suggested
multi-factor approach follows.223
IV. A PROPOSED MULTI-FACTOR ANALYSIS
A multi-factor analysis balances the many competing interests of
plaintiffs, defendants, and the judicial system. Minnesota courts should
not hesitate to adopt a case-by-case approach rather than the current
rigid application of arbitrary rules.224 Prejudgment interest is a form of
damages. It should not be affected by the underlying claim be it con-
tract, tort, or property. Interest as a part of damages, whether it is
awarded because of excessive delay, wrongful detention of a plaintiff's
use of his money, as just compensation to restore the injured party to
status quo, or as a remedy to deprive the defendant of unjust enrichment,
should depend on the exercise of the trial court's discretion arising out of
its equitable jurisdiction.225 This limitation would establish the rule in
Minnesota that interest is available as a matter of right only under the
date of the verdict statute.226 Prejudgment interest would be afforded
only as a matter of the court's discretion under the court's equity juris-
diction on a case-by-case analysis.
Traditionally, the liquidated-unliquidated factor was the controlling
factor used by Minnesota courts. 22 7 Yet the liquidated-unliquidated fac-
tor is the most complex and confusing of all factors used to determine
whether prejudgment interest should be awarded. 228 The essence of the
222. See id. at 71-72, 436 A.2d at 157 (Roberts, J., dissent).
223. The Minnesota legislature should enact a prejudgment interest statute that
awards interest from the date of the injury or the date the suit was commenced. See supra
note 17. This would be the preferred way to revise and update the prejudgment interest
rules in Minnesota.
224. For a discussion of interest as a part of damages being allowed not by application
of arbitrary rules, but as a result of the justice of the individual case and a compensation
to the injured party, see 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 179, at 256-57 (1965).
225. See D. DoBBs, supra note 1, § 3.5, at 165-66 (general overview of numerous reasons
for awarding and denying prejudgment interest).
226. See supra note 17.
227. See supra notes 25-125 and accompanying text.
228. See, e.g., D. DOBBS, supra note 1, at 165-66. Dobbs suggests an abandonment of
the analysis awarding prejudgment interest based on liquidated or ascertainable claims.
What remains when all the talk of liquidated and ascertainable claims is excised
is a fairly rational collection of guidelines. (1) Would an award of interest dupli-
cate any other elements already awarded? (2) Was there actually any loss by the
plaintiff, and if not (3) was there any unjust gain by the defendant reasonably
measurable in terms of interest? (4) Was there a contract between the parties on
which the claim is based, and if so, does the nature of the contract indicate an
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liquidated-unliquidated analysis as adopted by the Minnesota courts is
whether the amount is ascertainable prior to the verdict. Courts have
readily allowed prejudgment interest on tort claims for injury to property
where the value of the property loss can be ascertained from concrete
facts. 229 An analysis based upon ascertainability, however, does not aid
the court in its treatment of damages in tort for personal injuries because
the pecuniary value of personal injury claims often cannot be readily
ascertained. For the Minnesota courts to fully compensate plaintiffs and
prevent unjust enrichment of defendants, the courts should expand their
analysis to include multiple factors rather than following the inflexible
liquidated-unliquidated approach.
Whether a Minnesota court should allow prejudgment interest should
depend on several factors. These factors will be to encourage Minnesota
courts to utilize a case-by-case, multi-factor analysis to balance the com-
peting interests of the parties involved. The decision to allow or deny
prejudgment interest should rest on whether the court allows or denies
interest as a matter of right or discretion, whether the underlying claim
sounds in contract or tort, whether interest should be allowed for "unrea-
sonable and vexatious delay," as well as for other, miscellaneous factors,
rather than under the current liquidated-unliquidated approach adopted
in Minnesota. It is within the court's equitable discretion to analyze a
prejudgment interest demand through any or all of these factors and to
award prejudgment interest in a requisite case.
A. The Matter of Right Versus Dscretion Factor
The characterization of interest as a matter of right or as a matter of
discretion is a pivotal factor in whether the trial court allows or denies
interest.2 30 In several jurisdictions, how interest is characterized is found
in statutes or case precedent.2 3 1 Minnesota law is not clear on this mat-
ter.232 Minnesota law does allow by statute, however, that interest be
calculated from the date of the verdict as a matter of right.2 33 This limi-
tation implies that prejudgment interest can be awarded as a matter of
intent to either charge or forego interest in the situation before the court? The
answer to these questions would furnish a reasonable guide to the award of inter-
est. Since courts have moved steadily toward more liberal grants of interest, and
have increasingly departed from standards based upon liquidated of claims, it
seems reasonably likely that some such set of guidelines, of approximately, if not
exactly this order, will affect decisions--subject, of course, to local statutes.
Id. at 174.
229. See, e.g., Polaris Indus. v. Plastics, Inc., 299 N.W. 2d 414 (Minn. 1980) (where the
court distinguishes between liquidated and unliquidated items).
230. See D. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 3.5, at 172-74; 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 190 (1965).
231. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 78-125 and ac-
companying text. one suggestion is to allow judicial discretion in the instance of delay by
either party. See Comment, supra note 28, at 740.
233. See supra note 17.
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right in all liquidated claims and as a matter of discretion in all unliqui-
dated actions.234 Despite this inference, it is unclear when a Minnesota
plaintiff with an unliquidated claim that is fixed and established by a
readily ascertainable standard 23 5 is entitled to prejudgment interest
whether as a matter of right or discretion. Thus, until the Minnesota
Supreme Court clarifies this uncertainty, a trial court should use the
matter of right or discretion factor as only a preliminary factor.
B. The Tort-Contract Distinction Factor
Prior to the liquidated-unliquidated approach, many courts decided
whether prejudgment interest should be allowed by asking whether the
action sounded in tort or contract. 236 The answer to this question re-
sulted in different outcomes. If the action sounded in tort, courts follow-
ing the tort-contract distinction automatically denied prejudgment
interest whether the claim was liquidated or unliquidated. 23 7 If the ac-
tion sounded in contract, the analysis turned on whether the amount was
liquidated or unliquidated.238 If the amount was liquidated, prejudg-
ment interest was awarded; if the amount was unliquidated, prejudg-
ment interest was not awarded. The trend toward analyzing tort actions
under the same rules as contract actions is summarized in Arizona Title
Insurance & Trust Co. v. O 'Malley Lumber Co. :239
We do not see in these cases [the older prejudgment interest cases],
however, any essential distinction between contract claims and tort
claims. Apart from the inherently unmeasurable damages to the per-
234. See, e.g., Bonhiver v. Graff, 311 Minn. 111, 134, 248 N.W.2d 291, 304-05 (1976);
Moosbrugger v. McGraw-Edison Co., 284 Minn. 143, 160, 170 N.W.2d 72, 82 (1969);
Lacey v. Duluth, M. & Iron Range Ry., 236 Minn. 104, 107-08, 51 N.W.2d 831, 834
(1952); Swanson v. Andrus, 83 Minn. 505, 510, 86 N.W. 465, 467 (1901).
235. For a statement of the rule without comment as to whether interest is awarded as
a matter of right or discretion, see Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d
169, 189 (8th Cir. 1971).
236. See Lovell, v. Marianna Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 267 Ark. 164, 166-67, 589 S.W.2d
577, 578 (1979), where the court notes:
It does not appear that recovery of interest prior to judgment is dependent upon
whether the claim is liquidated or whether it sounds in tort or contract. The test
in prejudgment interest cases [in Arkansas] is whether there is a method of deter-
mination of the value of the property at the time of the injury. If such a method
exists, prejudgment interest should be allowed. . . . Somewhere along the way a
line of cases appeared holding that prejudgment interest was not allowed in tort
actions. . . . we returned to the former rule which allowed prejudgment interest
[where the compensation can be measured by market value or other definite
standards].
Id. See a/so Banner Realty, Inc. v. Turek, 113 Ariz. 62, 645 P.2d 798 (1976) (court disre-
gards the traditional distinction between tort and contract).
237. See,e.g., 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 189, at 267 n.16 (1965) (in North Dakota and
West Virginia, the state legislatures have enacted statutes permitting interest to be
awarded in certain tort actions.)
238. See supra notes 236.
239. 14 Ariz. App. 486, 484 P.2d 639 (1971).
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sonality mentioned in the earlier case [libel, slander and actions for
damages for personal injuries], there is nothing to indicate that a tort
claim cannot be a prejudgment interest bearing "liquidated"
claim. . . . Turning to the general law, we find that there seems to be
a cautious trend toward granting plaintiff in tort prejudgment interest
on a liquidated claim ...
. . . In line with what appears to be the soundly conceived modern
trend of authority, we hold that interest is awardable as a matter of
right in the case of a liquidated tort claim.
24°
Minnesota has never followed the tort-contract distinction utilized in
other jurisdictions. 24 t Even though the tort-contract distinction has gen-
erally been replaced with the liquidated-unliquidated approach, some
courts still analyze whether to award or deny prejudgment interest under
the tort-contract factor. If the tort-contract distinction arises in Minne-
sota, the court should find that this is only one factor in a multi-factor
analysis.
C The Unreasonable and Vexati'ous Delay Factor
Several courts allow prejudgment interest because without this judicial
remedy defendants will take unfair advantage of the plaintiffs where the
issue of liability is conceded. This factor was pivotal in the recent cases
of In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago ,242 Bond v. City of Huntington ,243 Busik
v. Levine,244 and Laudenberger v. Port Authori'ty,245 as well as in a growing
number of other courts. 246 The courts reasoned that the defendants were
merely attempting to prolong bona fide resolutions of the plaintiffs'
lawsuits.247
Under the unreasonable and vexatious delay factor, a trial court
awards prejudgment interest for defendant's delinquency. The theory
240. Id. at 496, 484 P.2d at 649 (emphasis in original).
241. From the first case focusing on the conversion, detention and destruction of per-
sonal property, Minnesota has allowed prejudgment interest to be recovered on liquidated
tort claims. See Murphy v. Sherman, 25 Minn. 196 (1878); see also supra notes 25-125 and
accompanying text.
242. 480 F. Supp. 1280, 1285 (N.D. Ill. 1979), affd, 644 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1981).
243. 276 S.E.2d 539, 548 (W. Va. 1981).
244. 63 N.J. 351, 358-59, 307 A.2d 571, 575-76, appealditmissed, 414 U.S. 1106 (1973).
245. 496 Pa. 52, 59-61, 436 A.2d 147, 151-52 (1981) appeal dismissed sub nom. Bucheit v.
Laudenberger, 102 S.Ct. 2002 (1982).
246. See, e.g., Mrowka v. Crouse Cartage Co., 296 N.W.2d 782, 784 (Iowa 1980) (there
is merit to plaintiff's contention that a defendant may be unjustly enriched by deliberately
withholding payment to which plaintiff is entitled); Marrazzo v. Scranton Nehi Bottling
Co., 438 Pa. 72, 75, 263 A.2d 336, 338 (1970) (court notes that delay is a basis for allowing
prejudgment interest).
247. See, e.g., The Home Ins. Co. v. Olmstead, 355 S. 2d 310, 314 (Miss. 1978) (court
notes unreasonable delay); see generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 57a (unreasona-
ble delay noted as a reason for awarding prejudgment interest); Comment, Allowance of
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for recovery is either a punitive or just compensation theory.248 The
award of prejudgment interest under the delay factor is premised on the
trial court's equitable jurisdiction. 249 A court under its equitable juris-
diction could deny prejudgment interest in a liquidated claim where the
plaintiff was unfairly prolonging just resolution of the action.250 The de-
lay issue in conjunction with prejudgment interest award has yet to arise
before the Minnesota Supreme Court. Minnesota trial courts ought to
take notice of this equitable remedy in light of the severe congestion of
the courts.
D. Other Factors Courts Utilize to Award or Deny Prejudgment Interest
Other factors courts have examined are whether there exist multiple
defendants in the lawsuit,251 whether the plaintiff kept an accurate ac-
counting of the alleged damages, 252 whether the jury verdict conforms
substantially with the plaintiffs claim for damages,2 53 and whether the
defendant holds plaintiffs money during a period of spiraling
inflation. 2
54
E. A Proposal for the Mnnesota Courts to Adopt
If the Minnesota court approaches the prejudgment interest issue from
a multiple-factor analysis, the number of issues in a particular case may
bear on whether the plaintiff should be awarded prejudgment interest.
Because prejudgment interest is a remedial damages remedy and not a
substantive element that plaintiffs rely on in making a contract or enter-
ing into an agreement, the fact that the defendant cannot predict exactly
how much he might owe if the court finds him liable for damages should
not be a controlling factor. Rather, the more equitable approach of a
multi-factor analysis for awarding prejudgment interest should be uti-
lized by the Minnesota courts. A trial court should analyze a claim for
prejudgment interest under a multi-factor analysis in the following order
of priority: first, whether the award of interest is a matter of right or a
248. See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text; see also Comment, supra note 38, at
740 (prejudgment interest should be awarded for delay under punitive and compensatory
theories of recovery).
249. See Comment, supra note 38, at 746.
250. Id. See also The Homes Ins. Co. v. Olmstead, 355 So.2d 310, 314 (Miss. 1978),
(court notes plaintiff's unreasonable delay in denying prejudgment interest).
251. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 480 F. Supp. 1280, 1284 (N.D. Ill.
1979), aj'd, 644 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1981). The presence of multiple defendants makes it
difficult for a defendant to know the amount of damages he may tender to stop the run-
ning of interest. Thus, a court is less willing to award prejudgment interest. Id.
252. See Polaris Indus. v. Plastics, Inc., 299 N.W.2d 414, 417-48 (Minn. 1980).
253. See Potter v. Hartzell Propeller, Inc., 291 Minn. 513, 519, 189 N.W.2d 499, 504
(1971).
254. See I.W. Berman Properties v. Porter Bros., Inc., 276 Md. 1, 20, 344 A.2d 65, 77
(1975) (owner held contractor's money in a period of spiraling inflation).
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discretionary matter with the court; second, whether the underlying
claim sounds in contract or tort; third, whether the plaintiff or defendant
has unreasonably and vexatiously delayed resolution of the dispute; and
finally, any other factor which the trial court in its equitable discretion
thinks will lead to just compensation.
V. CONCLUSION
In recent years, due to the high interest rates255 and large judgment
awards256 the award of prejudgment interest is of growing concern for
attorneys. 257 Prejudgment interest can be a substantial portion of the
total judgment 2 58 and an effective mechanism for the court to use to
pressure parties to shorten the discovery process or to settle cases. The
number and length of lawsuits are reduced by a prejudgment interest
"penalty" which increases as time passes.259 Thus, prejudgment interest
255. See Goodwin v. Upper Crust of Wyoming, Inc., 624 P.2d 1192, 1198 (Wyo. 1981)
where the court comments:
Appellees were entitled to the use of the money they were to receive under the
agreement from the date it became due. The use of money has real economic
value, particularly in the current economy of inflation and high interest rates of
which we take judicial notice. Appellees were deprived of that benefit. Prejudg-
ment interest should have been awarded as an attempt to compensate for that
loss.
Id. See also Fisher & Hartnett, Admissibility of Economic Testimony on Future Inflation, 18 S.
TEX. L.J. 59 (1977) (general discussion of the impact of inflation on judgments); Formuzis
& O'Donnell, Inflation and the Valuation of Future Economic Losses, 38 MONT. L. REV. 297
(1977) (general discussion of inflation and its impact on verdicts); Note, Future Inflation
Prospective Damages, and the Circuit Courts, 63 VA. L. REV. 105 (1977) (analysis of the circuit
courts' positions on including inflation in judgments and verdicts for prospective damage
awards).
256. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 480 F. Supp. 1280, 1285 (N.D. Ill.
1979), afrd 644 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1981) (estimated between $115-500 million); Mayer v.
Braniff Airways, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 149 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (2.5 million dollars deposited with
the court); see generally Million Dollar Verdicts on the Upswing, 37 BENCH & B. OF MINN.,
May-June, 1981, at 44 (from 1970 to the present, over 380 verdicts have been rendered for
over one million dollars).
257. See Hare & Meelheim, supra note 9; Comment, supra note 2.
258. For a case that shows the considerable extent that prejudgment interest may have
on the final amount awarded the plaintiff, see Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Harvey, 558 P.2d
879, 878-88 (Alaska 1976) (court upheld prejudgment interest award of $604,000 where
defendant had use of the plaintiff's money for 7-1/2 years, regardless of whose fault it was
for the delay); see also Axler v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., No. 2888 (March, 1982, Phil. Ct.
C.P.) (jury returned verdict of $1,750,000 to which $500,000 was added under Penn-
sylvania's procedural rule for prejudgment penalty for failure to make a reasonable settle-
ment offer); Foley v. Clark Equip. Co., No. 5817 (Nov., 1981, Phil. Ct. C.P.) (jury award
of $15 million in compensatory damages and $3,008,218.80 under the Pennsylvania Rule
238 as to delay damages).
259. See, e.g., Laudenberger v. Port Auth., 496 Pa. 52, 58-61, 436 A.2d 147, 150-52
(1981) (court takes judicial notice of the excessive case load), appeal dismissed sub nom.
Bucheit v. Laudenberger, 102 S.Ct. 2002 (1982).
[Vol. 9
35
et al.: Prejudgment Interest in Minnesota
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1983
1983] PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 193
deters parties from excessive delays.
260
If the Minnesota legislature and courts are reluctant to address the
need for revision of interest from the date of the verdict statute and the
strict construction of the prejudgment interest rules in Minnesota, then
not only will injured parties continue to be under-compensated 26 1 but
parties can excessively delay the just resolution of lawsuits with little fear
of reprisal. 262
260. For articles on delay of judicial cases, O'Neill, How to Force Faster Litigation, 18
JUDGES J. 6 (1979); see Rosenburg & Sovern, Delay and Dynamics of Personal Injury Litigation,
59 COLUM. L. REV. 1115 (1959); Thompson,How to Get the Case Flow Moving, 18 JUDGES J.
12 (1979).
261. See Hare & Meelheim, supra note 9 (prejudgment interest is necessary to fully
compensate plaintiffs).
262. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 68.02 bars costs and disbursements to the plaintiff ifhe rejects a
sufficient offer of payment of the claim made by the defendant. There is no comparable
rule to penalize the defendant who frivolously delays a legitimate settlement.
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